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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS IN NEED OF A 
THEORY—IN DEFENSE OF INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS 
Ittai Paldor*
           In recent years theorists have argued that institutional investors’ 
diversification harms competition. The theory is that when portfolio firms 
are cross-owned by institutional investors, managements compete less 
vigorously than they would have but for the cross ownership. The theory 
was bolstered by several empirical studies. The supporting empirical 
studies have been contested on methodological grounds, and some recent 
empirical studies make contradicting findings. But the theory of 
competitive harm itself is still considered persuasive. The federal 
antitrust agencies and competition agencies across the globe have begun 
to take action against instances of cross ownership based on this theory, 
in what has been described as an attack on the entire system of mutual 
fund holdings. This Article resolves the mismatch between theory and the 
most recent empirical findings. The Article develops an understanding of 
cross ownership and its effects on portfolio firms’ conduct. It challenges 
the theory of competitive harm, and shows that institutional investors’ 
common ownership cannot adversely affect portfolio firms’ competitive 
conduct. Moreover, the Article shows that cross ownership actually 
safeguards against competitive harm of the kind envisioned in the 
literature. The theory developed in this Article suggests that enforcement 
measures taken against instances of cross ownership are socially 
harmful. They unduly deny investors the long-acknowledged benefits of 
diversification and disrupt the functioning of capital markets. These 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article suggests a new understanding of the competitive 
impact of institutional investors’ diversification strategy. The view 
currently prevalent in the literature, which has been adopted by the 
federal antitrust enforcement agencies and competition agencies 
across the globe, is that institutional investors’ cross ownership chills 
portfolio firms’ competitive incentives.1 The Article explains why this 
intuitive theory of competitive harm is flawed. In fact, the Article 
shows that institutional investors’ cross ownership actually safeguards 
against the competitive harm argued for in the recent literature. 
Institutional investors are “the dominant capital market players of our 
time, displacing dispersed individual investors, who now obtain 
exposure to equity markets through the intermediation of the 
institutional investors.”2 They have become the dominant owners of 
public equity in most Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries.3 According to an OECD report for 
2018, in approximately half of OECD countries institutional investors’ 
financial assets amounted to over 25 percent of the respective 
country’s GDP, and in some countries far exceeded the country’s 
GDP.4 Institutional investors account for the vast majority of equity-
holding across the globe. According to some estimates, nearly 80 
percent of the total value of the U.S. stock market is held by 
institutional investors.5 U.S.-registered investment companies 
 
 1. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Rise of Institutional Investors Raises Questions of Collusion, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/business/dealbook/rise-of-
institutional-investors-raisesquestions-of-collusion.html; Pauline Kennedy et al., The Competitive 
Effects of Common Ownership: Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence 2 (Jul. 26, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3008331 (unpublished paper); Menesh S. 
Patel, Common Ownership, Institutional Investors, and Antitrust, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 279, 281 
(2018) (although at least one of the investigations mentioned by Patel has apparently been 
abandoned); Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82 
ANTITRUST L.J. 221, 222 (2018); Case C-M.7932, Dow/DuPont, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2017), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf. 
 2. Eric A. Posner et al., A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional 
Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 669 (2017). 
 3. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., OECD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STATISTICS 2010–
2017, at 15–108 (2018). 
 4. Id. at 12–14. 
 5. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 674; Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money 
Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class 
Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2056 (1995); Patel, supra note 1, at 279; José Azar et al., 
Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1514 (2018); Einer Elhauge, 
Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1277–78 (2016). 
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“managed more than $19 trillion in assets at year-end 2016, largely on 
behalf of more than 95 million US retail investors.”6 The total value 
of the assets held by these institutional investors is constantly rising.7 
In the United Kingdom, institutional investors managed 
approximately £4.75 trillion  in assets in 2016,8 and direct ownership 
of stock by retail investors has declined from 54 percent in the mid-
1960s to 11 percent in 2014.9 In Canada, too, institutional portfolio 
has been constantly rising for 65 years.10 By 2014 institutional 
investors held nearly C$2 trillion in assets.11 Across OECD countries, 
assets held by institutional investors totaled more than $73.4 trillion in 
2011.12 Any rule regulating the investment strategies of these investors 
is thus of major significance to the U.S. economy, as well as to the 
global economy. 
Institutional investors regularly diversify their investment across 
a large number of firms and industries.13 This diversification is 
socially important. First, diversification safeguards the investment 
against idiosyncratic (both firm-specific and industry-specific) risk.14 
Second, and closely related, diversified investments obviate the need 
to pick specific stock.15 This lowers the cost of obtaining information 
and analyzing it,16 and even the cost of monitoring management. At 
 
 6. INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND 
ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 6 (57th ed. 2017). 
 7. See id. at 6–9. The constant trend has shown two dips, in 2008 and in 2011. Id. at 9. Both 
resulted in an almost immediate bounce back. Id. For a survey of a similar trend across the OECD 
area (a 6.6 percent average annual increase in the 1995–2005 decade), see Eric Gonnard et al., 
Recent Trend in Institutional Investors Statistics, 2008 OECD J.: FIN. MKT. TRENDS 1, 1, 3, 
http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/42143444.pdf. 
 8. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., OECD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STATISTICS 2009–
2016, at 168–69 (2017). 
 9. Serdar Çelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors and Ownership Engagement, 2013 
OECD J.: FIN. MKT. TRENDS 93, 93, 96 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/finance/Institutional-
investors-ownership-engagement.pdf. 
 10. Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The Role of Institutional and Retail Investors in Canadian Capital 
Markets, 31 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 371, 373–74 n.1 (1993). 
 11. Alix d’Anglejan-Chatillon & Jeffrey Elliott, Canada, in THE ASSET MANAGEMENT 
REVIEW 111, 118 (Paul Dickson ed., 6th ed. 2017); Research, 2015 Canadian Institutional 
Investors: Institutional Asset Allocation, Greenwich Assocs. (Jan. 2016), 
https://www.greenwich.com/sites/default/files/files/reports/2015%20Canadian%20Institutional%
20Investors%20-%20Institutional%20Asset%20Allocation%20-%20Graphics.pdf. 
 12. Çelik & Isaksson, supra note 9, at 97. 
 13. Patel, supra note 1, at 283–84. 
 14. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 89 (1952). 
 15. Dov Solomon, Rational Apathy of Shareholders: How to Awake Investors from Their 
Sleep, 39 TEL AVIV UNIV. L. REV. 317, 340–41 (2016). 
 16. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 672–73. 
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times, the diversification is achieved almost mechanically through 
index funds,17 which require practically no analysis prior to 
purchasing stock, and no post-purchase monitoring of day-to-day 
activities.18 In other cases, the diversification is less mechanical. But 
whether the investment is entirely mechanical or requires some limited 
human involvement, the costs of investment are reduced dramatically. 
Of course, the reduced risk and lower costs of investment benefit not 
only the institutional investors themselves, but also retail investors. 
These advantages translate into lower fees and reduced risk for retail 
investors.19 
One immediate result of institutional investors’ diversification 
and the large amount of funds they manage is that they own stock of a 
large number of firms and across a large number of industries.20 
Institutional investors are estimated to be the (joint) largest 
shareholders of nearly 90 percent of public companies in the S&P 
500.21 When combined, the largest institutional investors (BlackRock, 
Vanguard and State Street) are “the single largest shareholder of at 
least 40 percent of all public companies in the United States.”22 
Naturally, institutional investors’ portfolio is often comprised of stock 
of several firms that are active in the same industry. “The probability 
that two randomly selected [S&P 1500] firms in the same industry . . . 
have a common shareholder with at least 5% stakes in both firms [is 
in the vicinity of] 90 percent . . . .”23 
 
 17. Which Posner et al. estimate account for less than 20 percent of the U.S. stock market. Id. 
at 673. See id. at 673 n.12 for an explanation of this estimate. 
 18. For a comprehensive account of index funds’ disengagement in what they term “micro-
mechanisms” and for an analysis of why involvement in portfolio firms’ day-to-day activity is 
unlikely, see C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common 
Ownership, 129 YALE L.J. 1392, 1450–52 (2020). 
 19. See Posner et al., supra note 2, at 673. 
 20. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1268. 
 21. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 674. 
 22. Id. 
 23. José Azar, Portfolio Diversification, Market Power, and the Theory of the Firm 2 (2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2811221 (unpublished paper). 
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At the same time, many industries are oligopolistic industries,24 
in which there are relatively few competitors.25 Given the prevalence 
of oligopolistic industries on the one hand and the dominance of 
institutional investors on the other, it seems safe to conclude, as 
scholars and others do, that diversification by institutional investors 
has resulted in a widespread phenomenon of several institutional 
investors holding stock of several firms that compete amongst 
themselves in oligopolistic product markets.26 
Until relatively recently, the passive common ownership 
phenomenon was considered competitively benign. As such, it was 
exempt from antitrust scrutiny and from premerger notification filings 
under what has come to be known as the “investment-only exemption” 
afforded by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act 
(HSR).27 The HSR imposes premerger notification obligations on 
parties to certain stock acquisitions and mergers, most notably 
acquisitions of stock meeting minimum “size-of-transaction” and 
“size-of-person” thresholds.28 Such transactions require premerger 
notifications to be filed with the federal antitrust agencies—the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.29 When 
premerger notification is mandated, the parties may not consummate 
the merger until a thirty-day waiting period from the day of filing has 
 
 24. Martin Pelletier, Our Nation of Oligopolies Not Good for Consumers, but Great for 
Investors, FIN. POST (July 31, 2018), https://business.financialpost.com/investing/how-canadas-
oligopolies-have-been-big-winners-for-investors; Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1278 n.50 (pointing out 
that industry definitions may be different from antitrust market definitions); Business in America: 
Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.economist.com/news/brief
ing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs-giant-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing. 
 25. The generally accepted concentration measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
which sums the squares of each firm’s market share. Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, an 
industry with an HHI above 2500 is generally considered highly concentrated. See U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
& FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 18–19 (2010) [hereinafter 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]. As explained subsequently, this regularly implies an industry 
with four competitors or fewer. 
 26. Corporate Concentration: The Creep of Consolidation Across America’s Corporate 
Landscape, ECONOMIST (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/0
3/daily-chart-13. On oligopolistic markets, see George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. 
ECON. 44 (1964). 
 27. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9) (2018). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a). The size-of-transaction threshold has recently been raised to $376 
million, or $94 million if either the acquiring or acquired party has annual net sales or total assets 
of at least $18.8 million and the other party has annual net sales or total assets of at least $188.8 
million (the “person-size-threshold”). See Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the 
Clayton Act, 86 Fed. Reg. 7880, 7880 (Mar. 4, 2021). 
 29. 15 U.S.C.  § 18a(d). 
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elapsed.30 During this waiting period, the agencies assess whether or 
not the effect of the proposed transaction may be to substantially 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of 
commerce, as per section 7 of the Clayton Act.31 If they find the 
proposed merger competitively problematic, they may attempt to 
block it.32 
The HSR exempts acquisitions meeting the thresholds from 
premerger notification obligations when the acquirer will not hold 
over 10 percent of the issuer’s voting securities, and when the 
acquisition is made “solely for the purpose of investment.”33 Until 
recently, this exemption was interpreted to apply to institutional 
investors’ acquisition of stock for purpose of investment.34 
Consequently, when institutional investors purchased stock as part of 
their ordinary course of business, the purchase was effectively 
immune from antitrust scrutiny. Legal doctrine echoed the economic 
understanding according to which such transactions posed no 
competitive harm.35 
But the tide has changed. Recent academic work has argued that 
the phenomenon of several institutional investors holding equity of 
 
 30. Id. § 18a(a), (b)(1)(B). 
 31. Id. § 18. 
 32. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFF., INTRODUCTORY GUIDE I: WHAT 
IS THE PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM? AN OVERVIEW 13–14 (2009), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/premerger-introductory-guides/guide1.pdf 
[hereinafter INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO PREMERGER NOTIFICATION]. In order to facilitate an 
effective review, the HSR sets a statutory waiting period (thirty days for most transactions, and 
fifteen days in the case of a cash tender offer or a bankruptcy sale), during which the transaction 
may not be consummated. See id. at 9. 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9). The HSR Rule 801.1i(1) states: “Voting securities are held or 
acquired ‘solely for the purpose of investment’ if the person holding or acquiring such voting 
securities has no intention of participating in the formulation, determination, or direction of the 
basic business decisions of the issuer.” 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(i)(1) (2020). 
 34. But see Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: 
Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 562, 602–03 (2000) (contesting 
the point made in 5 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1203(d), at 
322(1980)); David Gilo, The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(2000). Note, however, that Gilo focuses on the anti-competitive effects of passive investments by 
a single shareholder that controls one of the firms. Id. at 22–28. See also O’Brien & Salop, supra 
note 34, at 585 for an analysis of horizontal joint ventures acting independently of their parents’ 
incentives. 
 35. A comprehensive account of both the case law and the enforcement policy of the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission is offered by Rock & Rubinfeld, supra 
note 1, at 252–58. On the ‘investment-only’ exemption, see Debbie Feinstein et al., “Investment-
Only” Means Just That, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 24, 2015, 5:25 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/08/investment-only-means-just. 
(8) 54.3_PALDOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/21  2:49 PM 
792 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:785 
firms that compete in oligopolistic product markets is competitively 
harmful. Importantly, the argument is that institutional investors’ cross 
ownership of stock in oligopolistic markets results in coordinated-like 
anti-competitive pricing even if these institutional investors do not 
control any of the firms in which they invest, and regardless of these 
institutional investors’ conduct; that is even if they do not coordinate 
amongst themselves or communicate with management in any way.36 
The argument is that “no such communication or coordination is 
necessary for the basic anti-competitive effect, which turns purely on 
the structural incentives created by horizontal shareholdings.”37 
The theory itself seems fairly straightforward: Competition 
between firms in the same industry erodes total industry profits. When 
institutional investors cross-own firms that compete in the same 
industry, they prefer that competition between these firms be as lax as 
possible. If feasible, they prefer that competition be entirely 
eliminated. Economically, cross-owning institutional investors are 
invested in the industry as a whole and not in a specific firm. Much 
like any cross-owning shareholder, institutional cross owners gain 
nothing from one portfolio firm increasing its market share at its 
competitors’ expense. They thus have nothing to gain and everything 
to lose from price reductions, and prefer that competition between 
portfolio firms be eradicated. That much is true for any cross owner of 
stock. However, institutional investors are unique in an important 
aspect. In addition to their interest in lax competition, their holdings 
are publicly known38 and they are prominent market players. Portfolio 
firms’ managements are aware that they are owned by shareholders 
who have stake in the firm’s competitor (or competitors) as well. Even 
if nothing is communicated from the institutional investors, and even 
if these investors do not control the firms or instruct management, 
managers realize that their shareholders want them to compete less 
vigorously, and relax competition. In other settings of cross 
 
 36. See O’Brien & Salop, supra note 34, at 568; Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1558; Posner et 
al., supra note 2, at 676; Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1270. 
 37. Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1274. 
 38. When the investors are index funds, their holdings are obvious to all. Even if they are not, 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules require all institutional investors to disclose all 
their holdings quarterly. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2012); Form 13F—Reports Filed by Institutional 
Investment Managers, INVESTOR.GOV: U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.investor.gov/in
troduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/form-13f-reports-filed-institutional-investment 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2021); see Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 221. 
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ownership, managements do not necessarily know who their non-
controlling shareholders are, because these are anonymous investors. 
Even if managements know who their own shareholders are, they do 
not know who their competitors’ shareholders are. Thus, under regular 
circumstances, cross ownership will have no adverse impact on 
competition, unless the shareholders’ preferences are expressly 
communicated, and management is instructed to not compete 
accordingly. By contrast, when institutional investors cross-own, 
competition between portfolio firms is spontaneously chilled. The 
theory itself is intuitive, and its underpinnings have attracted very little 
attention. 
The hypothesis that cross ownership by institutional investors 
dampens competition was supported by an influential empirical 
article. Azar et al., focusing on the airline industry, attempted to assess 
the effect of a change in shareholder-level concentration on ticket 
prices.39 They utilized a “natural shock”—a merger between 
institutional investors that hold stock in the airline industry—to gauge 
the effect of a change in shareholder-level concentration on ticket 
prices.40 They found that following BlackRock’s acquisition of 
Barclays Global Investors, airline ticket prices increased by 3 percent 
to 7 percent.41 Given the approximately 4 percent profitability in the 
industry, this is a significant change.42 It implies that profitability 
increased by anything between 75 percent to 175 percent as a result of 
a change in shareholder-level concentration, with no apparent change 
in concentration in the industry itself.43 
The empirical findings were soon challenged by two sets of 
empirical articles. The first set of articles strikes at the original study 
itself, and challenges the study’s methodology and conclusions. The 
second set offers independent findings that are in opposition to those 
of the original study. Daniel O’Brien and Keith Waehrer,44 Edward 
 
 39. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1514. 
 40. Id. at 1535. 
 41. Id. at 1517–18. 
 42. Id. at 1517. 
 43. The authors used a modified measurement of concentration that accounts for ownership-
concentration (a modified HHI, “MHHI”), originally developed in O’Brien & Salop, supra note 
34. 
 44. Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: 
We Know Less Than We Think (Feb. 22, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2922677 (unpublished paper). 
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Rock and Daniel Rubinfeld,45 and Scott Hemphill and Marcel Kahan46 
all challenged the methodology of the original empirical study.47 
Kennedy et al. conducted an independent study of the same industry 
while addressing the methodological issues identified in the key 
empirical research.48 Their study found no effect of common 
ownership on prices.49 Similarly, Gramlich and Grundl conducted an 
independent study focusing on the banking industry,50 another 
industry in which an empirical study initially found supra-competitive 
profits associated with shareholder-level concentration.51 Gramlich 
and Grundl found mixed, although preliminary, results.52 The 
empirical pendulum has thus begun to swing back. But 
notwithstanding the state of the empirical research, the underlying 
theory of competitive harm remains unchallenged. Despite the 
empirical findings, the theory is considered compelling, and is heavily 
relied on.53 
Naturally, the recent economic analyses suggesting that passive 
cross ownership has an anti-competitive structural effect have been 
supplemented by legal arguments suggesting that institutional 
investors’ common ownership of oligopolistic firms’ stock should 
require premerger filing and antitrust scrutiny even when these are 
passive investments.54 It has been argued that the ‘investment-only’ 
exemption afforded by the HSR can and should be interpreted to be 
inapplicable to such acquisitions.55 
The academic writings challenging institutional investors’ 
business model have already begun to impact enforcement agencies. 
These writings have found a willing ear at the federal antitrust 
 
 45. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 1.  
 46. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18. 
 47. The original empirical study by Azar et al. was first available in 2014, when the authors 
posted it on Social Science Research Network. 
 48. Kennedy et al., supra note 1.  
 49. Id. at 22. 
 50. Jacob Gramlich & Serafin Grundl, Estimating the Competitive Effects of Common 
Ownership (Divs. Rsch. & Stat. & Monetary Affs., Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2017-029, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940137. 
 51. José Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition 1 (May 4, 2019), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 (unpublished paper). 
 52. Gramlich & Grundl, supra note 50, at 1. 
 53. E.g., Elhauge, supra note 5; Posner et al., supra note 2. 
 54. Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1309–12. 
 55. Id. at 1301–14; Posner et al., supra note 2, at 678. 
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agencies—the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission. These agencies have begun to investigate 
instances of cross ownership in several industries.56 The investigations 
themselves are a potential attack on the entire system of mutual 
fund holdings,57 given institutional investors’ sensitivity to 
controversy and scandals.58 If action is taken following these 
investigations, this will clearly force institutional investors to alter 
their competitive strategy. The European Commission has done even 
more than investigate instances of cross ownership. It has recently 
blocked a merger between Dow and Du Pont based, inter alia, on the 
recent theory of competitive harm.59 In fact, the European 
Commission seems to have even extended the theory of competitive 
harm, explaining that “[w]hile the economic literature has, to the best 
of the Commission’s knowledge, focused on the effects of cross 
shareholding and common shareholding on price competition, the 
economic rationale of such effects applies to innovation 
competition.”60 
The now-prevalent view that passive investments by institutional 
investors is competitively harmful has even brought about suggestions 
to limit institutional investors’ diversification, limiting them to either 
owning stock in no more than one firm per (oligopolistic) industry, or 
holding stock not exceeding 1 percent of the total value of any 
(oligopolistic) industry.61 Such proposals, if adopted, will adversely 
affect diversification, and significantly increase institutional 
investors’ portfolios’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk.62 
This Article develops a new understanding of the market forces 
at play. It argues that the competitive concerns are misplaced, and that 
 
 56. Kennedy et al., supra note 1, at 2 n.4; Solomon, supra note 1. Although at least one of 
these investigations has apparently been abandoned. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 275–
77. 
 57. Solomon, supra note 1. 
 58. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1435, 1442. 
 59. Case C-M.7932, Dow/DuPont, at 1, 28 n.85, Annex 5 (Mar. 23, 2017), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf. 
 60. Id. at 383. 
 61. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 708; see also Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 263–67 
(discussing alternatives to Posner et al.’s suggestions to limit institutional investors’ 
diversification). 
 62. Although Posner et al. argue that much of this exposure may be mitigated. See Posner et 
al., supra note 2, at 710–11. 
(8) 54.3_PALDOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/21  2:49 PM 
796 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:785 
antitrust law should not deal with institutional investors’ purely 
passive investments at all. 
Specifically, the Article explains that common ownership of stock 
does not harm competition in any way. The key reason for this is that 
common ownership by non-controlling institutional investors cannot 
incentivize managers to compete any less vigorously than they would 
have absent common ownership. Cross ownership can adversely 
impact competition only if institutional investors coordinate between 
themselves and communicate with portfolio firms in a very elaborate 
manner. Such coordination is neither alleged in the recent academic 
writings nor likely given the potential criminal liability and 
reputational cost associated with it. If managers are not spontaneously 
incentivized to complete less vigorously and are not explicitly 
instructed to do so, their competitive conduct will remain intact. Thus, 
passive (non-controlling) common ownership of stock does not 
worsen the competitive situation in any way. Spontaneous harm to 
competition is impossible. In fact, cross ownership safeguards against 
competitive harm of the kind argued for in the recent literature. 
The key observation developed in this Article is that in addition 
to increasing total industry profits, anti-competitive conduct of the 
kind argued for in the recent literature entails an additional inseparable 
element—the tunneling element. When firms engage in anti-
competitive coordination of the kind envisaged by the recent literature, 
they not only increase total industry profits. They also tunnel all of 
these profits to one of the firms. This is a unique feature of the anti-
competitive conduct argued for in the recent literature. In all other 
anti-competitive settings, all coordinating firms gain from the anti-
competitive conduct. The unique tunneling feature has important 
implications for the analysis of the anti-competitive potential. It makes 
spontaneous competitive harm unlikely, because some of the firms in 
the industry will lose from the coordinated conduct. 
As an illustrative example, we may consider two competitors, 
firm A and firm B, both of which sell an identical product for the 
competitive price of one dollar per unit. If they form a cartel, they can 
each profitably sell the product for three dollars per unit. The price 
increase will not result in loss of sales to the competitor (whose price 
will not be more attractive to consumers). A cartel will benefit both 
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coordinating firms to the tune of two dollars per unit.63 By contrast, in 
the anti-competitive setting envisaged by the recent theory of 
competitive harm, one of the competitors, firm A for example, 
increases its price to a level that is unprofitable for it (say, four dollars 
per unit), so that firm B may then profitably charge the monopoly price 
of three dollars per unit. From an overall industry perspective, the 
outcome is indeed similar to a cartel or a monopoly: The product will 
be sold to consumers for three dollars per unit, and industry profits 
will be maximized. From the joint shareholder’s (or shareholders’) 
perspective, such a result is even superior to that of an outright cartel. 
The joint shareholders will want managements to conduct themselves 
so that profits to flow to the firm in which the shareholders’ holdings 
are greater—firm B in the preceding example. Through their larger 
holdings in the firm to which profits are tunneled (firm B), the 
shareholders will accrue a larger portion of the industry’s rents. But 
importantly, the strategy is unprofitable from firm A’s perspective. It 
will make no sales at the price of four dollars. Firm A must lose, so 
that firm B profits. 
The anti-competitive conduct identified by the recent literature is 
thus markedly different from all other anti-competitive pricing 
settings. In all other long-recognized settings of anti-competitive 
pricing, all coordinating firms profit from coordination. Whether the 
coordination takes the form of an outright cartel, a merger, or tacit 
collusion,64 all coordinating (or merging) firms’ profits are increased 
as a direct consequence of the elimination of competition.65 By 
contrast, in the setting of passive cross ownership, all firms in the 
industry but one lose from the anti-competitive conduct. They are even 
worse off than they would have been under perfect competition. Not 
only the additional profits, but all industry profits are tunneled to one 
of the firms in the industry. 
 
 63. Firms in a cartel will also lose some sales, because elevated prices will price some 
consumers out of the market. Thus, the cartelistic firms will need to balance the additional two 
dollars per unit against the forgone profits. But this does not alter the core analysis. It complicates 
the computation of overall gains, but the overall effect on the firms’ profits will be positive. For an 
elaborate account of the difficulties in assessing the precise effects of cartels on prices, quantities, 
and profits, see DAVID ASHTON & DAVID HENRY, COMPETITION DAMAGES ACTIONS IN THE EU: 
LAW AND PRACTICE 213–19 (2013). 
 64. On tacit collusion, see generally Stigler, supra note 26 (discussing factors that govern the 
practicability of tacit collusion). 
 65. On the similarity between oligopolies and cartels, see Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and 
the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1566–75 (1969). 
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To be sure, as the tunneling effect accompanies an increase in 
total industry profits, there is scope for a mutually beneficial 
arrangement. The firm that directly benefits from the scheme, or the 
joint shareholder, may make payments to the other firms (or to their 
managements), thus incentivizing them to participate in the scheme. 
But the point is precisely that such an elaborate compensation 
mechanism is necessary. It must be negotiated and communicated to 
the managements and shareholders of the losing firms. Cross 
ownership cannot spontaneously harm competition. The implication 
of this observation on the likelihood of the scenario is dramatic and 
goes far beyond the mere technical issue of reaching an agreement. 
Both communicating with management on these issues and 
management’s acquiescence would violate antitrust laws as well as 
corporate fiduciary duties.66 And institutional investors’ sensitivity to 
scandals and criminal offenses makes them much less likely than 
others to participate in such a scheme. In any event, unless both 
managements and institutional investors are willing to take the risk of 
severe criminal sanctions, competition cannot be harmed in any way. 
Spontaneous harm to competition is certainly not a concern. 
A helpful analogy may be the difference between standard price-
fixing cartels and bid-rigging cartels.67 In a price fixing cartel, all 
cartel members directly profit from the cartel. They all share in the 
cartelistic rents. In a bid-rigging cartel, by contrast, only the bidder 
that is allocated the specific bid directly gains from the cartel. It wins 
the bid at prices that are more favorable to it than had it competed. But 
the immediate effect of a bid-rigging cartel on all other cartel members 
is negative. They lose the bid. This does not suggest, of course, that 
bid-rigging cartels are impossible. They can, and do, exist. But they 
require some agreed mechanism through which the losing cartel 
members are compensated by the cartel member that wins the bid, 
thereby conquering the entire market at a monopoly price.68 In some 
bid-rigging cartels the winning cartel member will make direct 
payments to other cartel members. In other bid-rigging cartels 
compensation takes the form of shielding the losing cartel members 
from competition in future bids by allocating future bids to these cartel 
 
 66. See infra text accompanying notes 132–39. 
 67. See ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION: 
CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS 29–54, 55–70 (2012). 
 68. Id. at 25. 
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members. Regardless of the precise compensation technique, 
spontaneous bid rigging is impossible. Similarly, in the scenario 
envisaged by the recent literature all firms but one lose from the 
coordinated conduct. A scheme for compensating them must therefore 
be put in place. Spontaneous harm to competition is unlikely. 
The idea of spontaneous competitive harm is, in fact, even less 
persuasive than the analogy to bid rigging suggests. This is due to the 
fact that it is not a single shareholder who cross-owns portfolio firms, 
but several institutional investors. The difference in these institutional 
investors’ holdings guarantees that if one institutional investor 
benefits from the scheme, another institutional investor will lose. As 
subsequently explained in detail, in all of the industries surveyed in 
the empirical studies, some institutional investors’ holdings were 
larger in one portfolio firm, while other institutional investors had 
larger stakes in other portfolio firms.69 Thus, any conduct that tunneled 
profits to the benefit of one institutional investor would have 
simultaneously harmed other institutional investors. The scheme 
would harm the majority of the prominent shareholders—precisely 
those shareholders that managements presumably want to benefit. 
Another layer of complication is introduced. Not only are managers 
ill-incentivized to participate in the scheme, they also cannot 
spontaneously realize which institutional investor they are to serve, 
and which they are to alienate. The fact that there are many 
institutional investors who cross-own further frustrates any possibility 
of spontaneous harm. 
Once again, an agreement could theoretically be struck between 
institutional investors according to which the benefitting institutional 
investor compensates the losing institutional investors. But such an 
agreement would, as explained, be an outright criminal offense, which 
institutional investors are unlikely to engage in. In any event, 
spontaneous coordination is impossible. Perhaps counter-intuitively, 
cross ownership by several institutional investors actually safeguards 
against any spontaneous anti-competitive outcome. 
Finally, spontaneous competitive harm is less likely not only due 
to lack of (managerial) incentive and due to other shareholders’ 
expected retaliation, but also due to the difficulty of reaching an 
equilibrium without explicit coordination, which, again, is neither 
 
 69. See infra text accompanying notes 150–65. 
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alleged nor likely.70 Under standard coordination, all firms must price 
at the monopoly price that optimizes industry profits (three dollars in 
the numeric example previously used).71 This price is known to all 
firms in the industry. Coordination is thus relatively simple.72 By 
contrast, the anti-competitive setting envisioned by the recent theory 
of competitive harm requires differential pricing, with some firms 
pricing at supra-monopolistic levels, and others pricing at the 
monopoly level. This requires a far more complex and elaborate 
agreement. Firms must agree on which firms will price at one price 
and which will price at another. Another layer of complexity is 
introduced, again complicating any hope of spontaneous coordination. 
The theory developed in this Article helps understand the findings 
of the recent empirical studies. As mentioned, the most recent 
empirical studies find no correlation between shareholder-level 
concentration and prices. These findings are puzzling, given what 
seems to be an infallible theory of competitive harm. The recent 
empirical studies and the theory developed in this Article reinforce one 
another. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows: Part I 
introduces the now-prevailing view according to which the cross-
ownership phenomenon is harmful to competition; Part II develops the 
key hypothesis of this Article. It challenges the arguments presented 
in Part I and attempts to demonstrate that there are no anti-competitive 
outcomes that are attributable to truly passive common ownership of 
stock. Part III discusses the empirical evidence. It reviews the criticism 
launched by O’Brien and Waehrer, Rock and Rubinfeld, and Hemphill 
and Kahan against the original empirical studies finding a correlation 
between shareholder-level concentration and industry profits. It also 
reviews the newer (opposite) findings. While additional empirical 
work is undoubtedly called for, the theory advanced in the current 
Article seems well supported by the most recent empirical studies and 
helps explain these findings. Part IV offers a brief conclusion. 
 
 70. See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1409, 1435. 
 71. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE §§ 1.2, 4.1 (5th ed. 2016). 
 72. Adherence and compliance are undoubtedly an issue because each firm has an inherent 
incentive to cheat on the cartel. Id. § 4.1. But at least the first element of coordination—setting 
prices, whether through an explicit agreement or through tacit collusion—is simple. 
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I.  THE THEORY OF COMPETITIVE HARM 
In order to understand the theory of competitive harm it is helpful 
to begin with the setting of a single retail investor holding stakes in 
competing firms, and then proceed to the more complicated setting of 
a single passive, non-controlling investor with cross holding in 
competing firms. Building on the analyses of these two settings, the 
more complex setting of several passive investors with non-
controlling stakes in competing firms can then be introduced and 
analyzed. This step-by-step analysis will help reveal the shortcomings 
of the hypothesis regarding cross ownership and its anti-competitive 
potential. 
Before proceeding, a preliminary note with respect to the 
structure of the product market is in order. The hypothesis developed 
in the literature is that cross ownership brings about spontaneous 
competitive harm in oligopolistic product market industries.73 The 
term ‘oligopolistic industry’ is an imprecise economic term. Industrial 
organization theory predicts that, all else equal, the intensity of 
competition will decrease as the number of competitors decreases.74 
But the precise price and output levels depend on a host of additional 
factors, making it impossible to accurately predict real life outcomes.75 
As a workable tool, the federal antitrust agencies use a widely 
accepted concentration index, the HHI,76 which is based on the 
number of competitors and on their respective market shares, to 
determine whether an industry is unconcentrated, moderately 
concentrated, or highly concentrated.77 For all practical purposes, we 
 
 73. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 19. But see Posner et al.’s point 
regarding markets with HHI’s that are lower than 2,500, but with relatively high MHHI’s (at 24). 
Posner et al., supra note 2, at 697–98. On the MHHI, see infra text accompanying note 178. 
 74. Stigler, supra note 26, at 57. 
 75. Id. at 48. 
 76. But see Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 487 n.99 
(2010) (arguing the HHI is not always an accurate indicator of when mergers will result in enhanced 
market power and increased prices). For a competing view, see Malcom B. Coate & Joseph J. 
Simons, In Defense of Market Definition, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 667 (2012) and Duncan Cameron 
et al., Good Riddance to Market Definition?, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 719 (2012). For Professor 
Kaplow’s response to several commentators, see Louis Kaplow, Market Definition Alchemy, 57 
ANTITRUST BULL. 915, (2012) and Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57 
ANTITRUST BULL. 887, 904–11 (2012) (discussing Professor Kaplow’s work and the “disconnect 
between merger analysis and articulated merger goals”). Despite the nearly decade-old challenges 
to market definition, it continues to be employed by the federal antitrust agencies. 
 77. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 18–19. The guidelines explicitly 
state that market shares and the tentative thresholds cannot be the end of the analysis:  
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may regard an oligopolistic industry as one with four major 
competitors or fewer.78 Following the analyses developed in recent 
writings, this Article too focuses on product markets in which 
competition is of an oligopolistic nature. For ease of exposition, I 
normally use the case of a product-market duopoly—a two-firm 
industry. The analysis is equally applicable to other highly 
concentrated markets.79 
 
The purpose of these thresholds is not to provide a rigid screen to separate competitively 
benign mergers from anticompetitive ones, although high levels of concentration do raise 
concerns. Rather, they provide one way to identify some mergers unlikely to raise 
competitive concerns and some others for which it is particularly important to examine 
whether other competitive factors confirm, reinforce, or counteract the potentially 
harmful effects of increased concentration. 
Id. at 19. 
 78. According to the HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, industries with HHIs of 2,500 and 
higher are considered highly concentrated. Id. Mathematically, an HHI of over 2,500 normally 
means that there are four or fewer major firms in the market, Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1277, 
although theoretically an industry with over four competitors may have an HHI of over 2,500, and 
this becomes more likely as the disparity in market shares increases. 
 79. Of course, the “but-for” quantity-price equilibria might be different; that is, the 
equilibrium in a three-firm oligopoly may be different than the equilibrium in a duopoly or a four-
firm industry. The different equilibria would depend not only on the number of competitors, but 
also on the nature of competition in the industry. See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 239–76 (1988) (analyzing how repeated interactions impact 
competition). But in terms of the effect common ownership has on competition, the analysis is no 
different. 
Closely related, the analysis developed in this Article is not to be taken to suggest that markets in 
which institutional investors are found to commonly own stock are necessarily competitive. 
Regardless of common ownership, tacit collusion, which is generally legal, see Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54 (2007); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993); In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 
2015), occurs in concentrated product markets. Neither the existence of tacit collusion nor the 
concomitant supra-competitive pricing is in any way challenged. Moreover, there might even be 
reason to expect firms in oligopolistic markets to be over-represented in institutional investors’ 
portfolios. Firms in relatively stable oligopolies can be expected to generate supra-competitive 
profits. If capital markets function perfectly, this should not make the stock of such firms a better 
investment opportunity. The supra-competitive rents should be reflected in the price at which the 
oligopolistic firms’ stock is traded, making the stock as lucrative as other firms’ stock in terms of 
the expected return on investment. Excessive product-market profits do not necessarily imply 
excessive returns on investment in the firms’ stock. But if there is any element requiring expertise 
in appraising the value of the stock—e.g., the likelihood of regulatory action or inaction, the 
probability of emerging competition, etc.—institutional investors may be better situated than less 
sophisticated (certainly lay) investors to identify these opportunities, which may result in over-
representation of such firms in institutional investors’ portfolio. On the efficient-market hypothesis, 
see generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 
25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (discussing various tests and evidence that support the efficient-markets 
model). This Article does not suggest in any way that firms in which institutional investors invest 
are typically in fierce product-market competition. But the argument advanced in the recent 
literature is that when the product market is oligopolistic, common ownership exacerbates the anti-
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A.  The Case of a Single Active Investor 
We may begin by focusing on a single retail investor, who 
monitors his or her investment and controls the respective 
managements of the firms in which he or she is invested. When such 
an investor diversifies his or her investment across competing firms, 
the competitive concern is straightforward: Any investor that has a 
stake in two or more competitors will naturally prefer lax competition 
between these competitors. The investor’s overall profits are 
maximized if the firms do not compete. An investor that has full 
control of two competing firms can obviously be expected to prevent 
all competition between the two firms. It will order the two firms to 
conduct themselves as if they were one, restricting output and raising 
prices to the monopolistic level.80 This is equally true for an investor 
that controls several firms in the same industry. Firms under joint 
control will conduct themselves as if they were a single fully merged 
firm. 
It is important to note that the joint controlling shareholder need 
not hold all outstanding stock of the firms, or even most of their stock, 
for this anti-competitive outcome. The threshold for control is lower 
the more dispersed ownership is.81 At times, control may be achieved 
with relatively small holdings in one or more of the firms.82 Regardless 
of the threshold for control, firms under common control are, from a 
competitive perspective, very similar to a single merged firm. 
Closely related, cross holdings may also facilitate cartel-like 
conduct even absent control. This may be facilitated through exchange 
of information and collusion, neither of which require control. A 
shareholder that has a representative on the board of directors of each 
of the firms may be able to transfer competitively sensitive 
information from one firm to the other,83 and even explicitly 
coordinate pricing and output. Such conduct does not require control. 
In fact, such collusion may be possible even if each of the respective 
 
competitive outcome by inducing what I will refer to as “unilateral coordination.” And this Article 
argues that they do not. 
 80. See Ariel Ezrachi & David Gilo, EC Competition Law and the Regulation of Passive 
Investments Among Competitors, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 331–34 (2006). 
 81. See O’Brien & Salop, supra note 34, at 570. 
 82. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 270. 
 83. Sharing of information would generally be considered a “plus factor,” tending to make 
tacit collusion, otherwise legitimate, actionable. See William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and 
Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 435 (2011). 
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firms has a controlling shareholder that is not the joint shareholder. 
Other shareholders also benefit from the elimination of competition 
and from supra-competitive pricing. The joint shareholder is, in this 
setting, benefitting not only herself, but also all shareholders of both 
firms. Other shareholders have little reason to object to coordination 
or prevent it.84 
A single, active, controlling shareholder that holds stock of two 
or more competitors may thus bring about a merger-like anti-
competitive outcome. And a single, active, non-controlling 
shareholder that holds shares in two or more competitors may facilitate 
collusion, whether tacit collusion or outright cartels. 
These kinds of anti-competitive outcomes are neither novel nor 
controversial. Antitrust law is, and has long been, well-equipped to 
deal with them. The first kind, cross holding that results in merger-like 
outcomes, is the main focal point of the rules regulating merger control 
as set out in the Clayton Act85 and the HSR. Merger control is aimed 
at preventing harm to competition in its incipiency.86 As mentioned, 
acquisition of shares in a firm meeting some threshold by a 
shareholder of a competing firm will normally require scrutiny by 
antitrust authorities, as per the HSR.87 This scrutiny is in place 
precisely to facilitate identification of anti-competitive potential of the 
kind described here. If the effect of the acquisition may be to 
substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce or in any 
 
 84. Even if the shareholder does not facilitate direct coordination, the mere fact that such a 
joint shareholder exists may provide both firms with comfort that inexplicit anti-competitive 
messages are received. Consider the following example: firm A is considering a price increase that 
will only be profitable if firm B also raises prices (otherwise firm B will capture all sales). Firm A 
wants to raise prices, hoping that firm B will follow suit. Under regular circumstances, firm A 
cannot be sure that firm B will understand that if it does not follow suit, A’s prices will be lowered. 
A joint board member—or a joint shareholder who communicates with his representatives on the 
respective boards—may be helpful in ensuring that the strategy is made known to the competitor, 
which can then be expected to cooperate even absent an explicit agreement to do so. Uncertainty, 
which challenges most tacit collusion situations, is resolved or mitigated through the joint 
shareholder. 
 85. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53). 
 86. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962); HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 1, 25. For an account of actual enforcement actions and trends, see 
Am. Antitrust Inst., Mergers, Market Power, and the Need for More Vigorous Enforcement 
(Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/mergerfinal.pdf 
(preview of a chapter from unpublished 2016 Presidential Transition Report). 
 87. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2018); INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO PREMERGER NOTIFICATION, 
supra note 32. 
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activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the agencies 
will challenge the merger.88 
The second kind of potential competitive harm, the facilitation of 
explicit or tacit collusion by a non-controlling shareholder, is also 
well-addressed by antitrust law. An increased likelihood of post-
merger collusion may bring about both an objection to a specific deal 
under the Clayton Act (when the deal requires premerger approval) 
and post-merger scrutiny under the Sherman Act (if the deal does not 
require approval).89 The Clayton Act addresses such concerns in the 
same way it addresses the concerns associated with a joint controlling 
shareholder. It preempts the competitive harm ex ante, by enjoining 
the transaction.90 The Sherman Act91 combats such collusion ex post, 
i.e., when such collusion has already been made possible, whether 
through a merger or through market characteristics. Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act prohibits horizontal collusion and makes it a criminal 
offense.92 This is well established antitrust doctrine.93 
B.  The Case of a Single Passive Investor 
The analysis is slightly complicated when the joint shareholder 
controls one of the firms but is a non-controlling passive shareholder 
in the other. This is taken to mean that the investor neither dictates the 
non-controlled firm’s conduct, nor delivers information (or explicitly 
 
 88. See 15 U.S.C. § 19.  
 89. On the forward-looking nature of merger control, see sources cited supra note 86; Deborah 
L. Feinstein, Director, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Speech at Advanced U.S. 
Antitrust Conference, San Francisco: The Forward-Looking Nature of Merger Analysis 1–3 (2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/forward-looking-nature-merger-
analysis/140206mergeranalysis-dlf.pdf. 
 90. 16 C.F.R. §§ 801, 802, 803 (2020); INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO PREMERGER 
NOTIFICATION, supra note 32, at 13–14. 
 91. Sherman Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7). 
 92. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), overruled by 
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). The case may have been decided 
differently today under the single-economic-entity doctrine. See BJÖRN LUNDQVIST, JOINT 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT UNDER US ANTITRUST AND EU COMPETITION LAW 33–34 
(2015); see also Competition Act 1998, c. 41 (Eng.). 
 93. On the analysis of this scenario, referred to as the “cartel ringmaster” scenario, and on the 
relevant case law establishing that such conduct constitutes an antitrust offense under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, see Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 222–24, 226–28. Although focusing on 
the hypothetical of a portfolio manager of a fund, the analysis is equally applicable to any cross-
holding “ringmaster.” 
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coordinates) between the firms.94 It controls and guides only the 
controlled firm. 
Ostensibly, the firms’ competitive conduct should remain intact 
despite the cross holding. Their conduct is not guided by the same 
shareholder, and there is no coordination between them. Nonetheless, 
and although less straightforward, scholars have identified anti-
competitive potential associated with such cross-shareholding as well. 
Professor Gilo refers to the case in which a firm’s controller invests in 
the firm’s competitor as “passive investment by controllers.”95 He 
shows that under such circumstances, the controller has both the 
incentive and the ability to stifle competition.96 If the controller’s 
financial interest in the non-controlled firm is larger than her financial 
interest in the controlled firm, the controller will have a preference for 
profits to flow from the controlled firm to the non-controlled firm.97 
As she controls the firm from which she wants profits to flow, the 
controller will cause that firm to raise prices or otherwise conduct 
itself so that profits flow to the firm in which her holdings are 
greater.98 
Consider the following example: Firm A and firm B are 
competitors. A shareholder owns 10 percent of firm A’s outstanding 
stock. She controls this firm, because ownership of the firm is 
dispersed, and no other shareholder owns any more than a trivial 
amount of firm A’s stock. The same shareholder also owns 15 percent 
of firm B’s outstanding stock. But she does not control firm B, because 
other shareholders own large portions of firm B’s stock. The 
shareholder clearly prefers profits and sales to be diverted from firm 
A to firm B. For every dollar diverted from firm A to firm B, this 
shareholder’s profits are increased by five cents (15 percent to 10 
percent). Although she cannot affect firm B’s conduct, the shareholder 
controls firm A. Firm A’s management can be instructed to raise the 
price firm A charges for the product, so that consumers shift demand 
to firm B. 
The general observation is that as long as there is any difference 
between the financial stakes the shareholder has in each of the firms, 
 
 94. See sources cited supra note 36. 
 95. Gilo, supra note 34, at 22. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 22–23. 
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the shareholder will have a preference for profits to flow to the firm in 
which his or her financial stake is greater. If the financial holdings in 
the controlled firm are smaller than the financial stakes in the non-
controlled competitor, the anti-competitive conduct becomes likely. 
As Gilo summarizes: 
 [W]hen a firm’s controller (be it a parent corporation or an 
individual) invests in the firm’s competitor, in addition to the 
controller’s stake in the competitor, the controller’s stake in 
the firm it controls becomes important. The smaller the 
controller’s stake in the firm it controls, the less aggressively 
will the controller cause the firm it controls to compete. This 
is because, the smaller the controller’s stake in the firm it 
controls, the more weight the controller places on its stake in 
the competing firm. This further implies that even relatively 
small stakes the controller holds in the competing firm could 
substantially lessen competition if the controller has a diluted 
stake in the firm it controls.99 
Importantly, this analysis requires no collusion or even 
communication between the firms or their respective managements. 
Even absent collusion and communication, cross-investment has anti-
competitive potential. The controller can be expected to cause the 
controlled firm to forego competition (and profit) so as to allow the 
competing firm (in which the controller has a greater financial stake) 
to reap the benefits.100 
An extremely important observation for the argument presented 
in this Article is that there is a stark difference between the two settings 
discussed thus far—the “classic” setting (in which the same 
shareholder controls both firms and exerts this control to relax 
competition) and the setting in which the shareholder controls only 
one of the firms (in which the shareholder’s holdings are smaller). 
In the first setting of a joint, active, shareholder, both coordinating 
firms’ profits are increased as compared to the no-coordination 
(competitive) counterfactual. Whether the shareholder controls the 
firms, thereby forming a de facto merger, or controls neither firm but 
acts as a coordinator, thereby forming a cartel (from an economic 
 
 99. Gilo, supra note 34, at 25 (footnote omitted). 
 100. Id. at 5; see also Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1270 (explaining that this anticompetitive effect 
will occur even absent communication or coordination between managers of firms). 
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perspective),101 both firms’ profits are increased through the 
elimination of competition between them. 
In the second setting, in which the controller controls one firm but 
has a (passive, but greater) financial stake in the other firm, the 
controlled firm loses from the anti-competitive “coordination.” It loses 
sales to its competitor, so that its competitor (in which the controller 
has a larger financial stake) may reap the benefits of this loss by 
charging monopoly prices. The controlled firm must raise its prices to 
levels exceeding the optimal monopoly price, an increase which is 
unprofitable by definition, so that its competitor may then profitably 
charge monopoly prices, thereby maximizing its own profits.102 The 
analysis of this second setting must be sensitive to the idea that one of 
the “coordinating” firms loses as a result of the “coordinated” conduct. 
This is acknowledged by both Gilo and O’Brien and Salop.103 
This observation will prove key for the analysis developed in this 
Article. For want of a better term, we may refer to the conduct of the 
firms in the latter setting of a joint shareholder who controls only one 
of the firms using the oxymoron “unilateral coordination.” Price levels 
in the industry are similar to those that would have prevailed under 
explicit coordination (monopoly prices). But only one of the firms, the 
one controlled by the joint shareholder, “coordinates” in the sense that 
it considers the effects of its own pricing on its competitor’s 
profitability. The other firm, the one not controlled by the joint 
 
 101. From a legal standpoint, this economic cartel may be permissible. If both firms are fully 
controlled by the same controller, they may be “incapable of conspiring . . . for purposes of § 1 of 
the Sherman Act.” Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984). Copperweld 
established what is known as the single-entity defense doctrine. Id. at 752. Note, however, that the 
Copperweld rule applies to a conspiracy alleged between a parent company and its wholly owned 
subsidiary. Id. The precise contours of the single-entity defense are unclear outside the 
paradigmatic setting of a parent company and a wholly owned subsidiary. For an account of 
subsequent case law, see Dean V. Williamson, Organization, Control, and the Single Entity 
Defense in Antitrust (U.S. Dep’t Just., Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper No. 
EAG 06-4, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/09/28/221876.pdf. 
 102. This kind of anti-competitive effect corresponds to what is referred to in merger control 
as “unilateral effects,” or the “recapture effect.” See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra 
note 25, at 20–24. The specific kind of unilateral effect that is relevant to the present context is the 
one discussed in section 6.1 of the HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES. See also Posner et al., supra 
note 2, at 682. 
 103. Gilo, supra note 34, at 5; O’Brien & Salop, supra note 34, at 568. O’Brien and Salop 
acknowledge this point, and explicitly make the distinction between financial interest and corporate 
control. See id. at 569. They tie their analysis to the seminal work of Berle and Means on the 
separation of ownership and control and its implications on the performance of an individual 
corporation. Id. at 563–64 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)). 
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shareholder, does not coordinate in any meaningful sense. It does not 
consider the effects of the coordination on its competitor’s profits. It 
simply responds to its competitor’s elevated prices, which allow it to 
profitably elevate its own prices to the monopolistic levels.104 
Unilateral coordination is very different not only from the 
previous scenarios of a de facto merger (a single controller directing 
both firms’ conduct) or a cartel, but also from standard tacit collusion. 
Much like a de facto merger and a cartel, tacit collusion benefits both 
coordinating firms.105 Under the regular oligopolistic setting, one firm 
raises its price (or otherwise conducts itself) attempting to signal the 
other firm to do the same. If the other firm does not reciprocate, the 
first firm returns to the competitive (or pre-collusion) prices, leaving 
neither firm better off.106 If the other firm reciprocates, both firms are 
better off than they would have been had they competed.107 By 
contrast, in the setting of unilateral coordination, the unilaterally 
coordinating firm is worse off than it would have been under 
competition, regardless of its competitor’s response. Tacit collusion 
and unilateral coordination are similar in the sense that one firm may 
raise prices to the benefit of the other firm without having coordinated 
explicitly with the other firm. But the two phenomena are nonetheless 
very different. The former is engaged in for the benefit of the firm 
engaging in it.108 The latter is engaged in for the opposite reason. 
By way of summary, it is helpful to consider the outcome under 
four different settings in a hypothetical two-firm industry, in which the 
competitive return is two dollars, duopoly rents are four dollars, and 
monopoly rents are six dollars. 
Under competition, both firms will split the competitive return. 
Each will enjoy a return of one dollar. Under duopoly, both firms will 
tacitly collude and split (duopoly) rents of four dollars, for a return of 
 
 104. Or to its competitors’ elevated prices, if the industry is not a duopoly. 
 105. And, indeed, the second kind of competitive concern associated with mergers is 
coordinated effects of the merger (i.e., its facilitation of coordinated conduct). See HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 25, at 24–27; Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and 
Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
135, 137 (2002). 
 106. See Edward J. Green et. al, Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Robert D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014) 
(analyzing the benefits and possibilities of tacit collusion among firms). 
 107. See Michael K. Vaska, Comment, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defining the 
Boundary, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 508, 510 (1985); Baker, supra note 105, at 137–38. 
 108. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 222. 
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two dollars per firm. Under a de facto merger (joint control), both 
firms will sell for the monopoly price and split the monopoly rents of 
six dollars, for a return of three dollars per firm. Under unilateral 
coordination, the unilaterally coordinating firm (the controlled firm) 
will sell for a price that exceeds the monopoly price (say, four dollars), 
allowing the firm in which the controller has a larger financial interest 
to profitably charge the monopoly price. All monopoly rents (six 
dollars) will accrue to the second firm, and the first firm will have 




In conformity with standard economic analysis, both firms find 
monopoly rents, which are the outcome of explicit coordination or a 
de facto merger, superior to duopoly rents, which are in turn superior 
to the competitive outcome. However, unilateral coordination is an 
improvement compared to all other possibilities from firm B’s 
perspective. Under unilateral coordination, all (not only a share of) 
monopoly rents accrue to it. By contrast, from firm A’s perspective, 
unilateral coordination is inferior not only to a de facto merger and to 
duopoly pricing, but even to perfect competition. Firm A’s only 
rationale for engaging in unilateral coordination is its controller’s 
instructions. 
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C.  The Case of Several Passive Investors 
The final development in the theory of competitive harm is fairly 
recent, and it is this development that is at the heart of this Article. 
Recent scholarly work has extended the analysis to situations in which 
the competing firms are jointly held by several investors, most 
commonly institutional investors, even if these investors control 
neither of the firms and do not coordinate amongst themselves.109 
The analysis seems like a straightforward extension of the 
unilateral coordination scenario. Instead of a single shareholder, 
several institutional investors jointly function as a single joint 
shareholder (in the sense that management seeks to serve their 
interests). The analysis is duplicated. Rather than a single shareholder 
owning stock of both firm A and firm B, we may think of two 
institutional investors, X and Y, who each own stock of both firm A 
and firm B. Their joint interest is to curtail competition between the 
competing portfolio firms (A and B), much like the single shareholder 
in the previous examples. Eliminating competition is seemingly even 
simpler than in the previous examples, because when the joint 
shareholder is a private shareholder, management does not necessarily 
know that the shareholder also owns stock in a competitor. In order 
for management to conduct itself anti-competitively, the shareholder’s 
interest in the competitor needs to be communicated to at least one of 
the firms’ managements. By contrast, institutional investors’ holdings 
are publicly known.110 Naturally, they are also known to the managers 
of the companies that are in these institutional investors’ portfolios. 
Consequently, “no such communication or coordination is necessary 
for the basic anticompetitive effect, which turns purely on structural 
incentives created by the interlocking shareholdings.”111 
Managements have no difficulty realizing the interest of their 
(joint) shareholders, and thus compete less vigorously. The 
competitive result is similar to the anti-competitive result discussed 
earlier. 
 
 109. Professor Elhauge argues that if the product market is relatively concentrated, then 
“[w]hen the same set of institutional investors has large, leading stock holdings across such a 
concentrated product market, their horizontal shareholdings are likely to be problematic.” Elhauge, 
supra note 5, at 1272. 
 110. See sources cited supra note 38. 
 111. Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1274; see also O’Brien & Salop, supra note 34, at 568 
(explaining the impact of financial interest and corporate control on the competitive incentives of 
the acquiring firms). 
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The theory is, as mentioned, rapidly gaining proponents. The 
federal antitrust enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commission, have reportedly launched 
investigations into instances of interlocking shareholding,112 and the 
European Commission has recently blocked a merger based, inter alia, 
on this theory of competitive harm.113 
II.  CHALLENGING (NOW) CONVENTIONAL WISDOM—CAN 
COMPETITION INDEED BE SPONTANEOUSLY CURTAILED? 
The argument developed in this Article is that institutional 
investors’ cross ownership does nothing to dampen competition. To 
be sure, such cross ownership may aid existing cartels by facilitating 
explicit coordination. It may also allow information to be shared, 
thereby aiding and stabilizing cartels. But there is wide consensus that 
institutional investors do not engage in coordination or in information 
sharing (between boards).114 And for a host of reasons enumerated by 
Hemphill and Kahan and reviewed subsequently, it is also unlikely 
that institutional investors will engage in such conduct.115 Therefore, 
if cross ownership does not harm competition through its structural 
impact on incentives, there is little reason to deal with it and unduly 
deny retail investors the benefits of diversification. 
First and foremost, the mechanism through which shareholders’ 
incentives supposedly trickle down to management is unclear. Unless 
such a mechanism is identified, there is little reason to fear that 
managers will unilaterally adopt any anti-competitive measures that 
they would not have adopted but for the cross ownership. It is here that 
the observation regarding the self-harming nature of unilateral 
coordination comes into play. Recall that in the context of unilateral 
coordination, the theory of competitive harm requires managers to 
relax competition in a manner that is detrimental to the firm that they 
manage. As demonstrated in the example presented earlier, the 
unilaterally coordinating firm essentially diverts profits to the 
 
 112. See sources cited supra note 56. 
 113. Case C-M.7932, Dow/DuPont, at 1 (Mar. 23, 2017), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf. 
 114. See sources cited supra note 37. 
 115. See infra text accompanying notes 214–21. Very briefly Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 
18, point to institutional investors’ incentives and sensitivity to illegal conduct; their regular 
conduct when engaging with portfolio firms’ managements; and their internal structure and modus 
operandi (with different teams having different incentives), as rendering these scenarios unlikely. 
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competitor by raising its own prices to an unprofitable level.116 Why 
would management conduct itself in a manner that harms the company 
under management? 
The intuitive answer to this puzzle is reciprocity. In the 
oligopolistic setting, the firm may expect its competitor to follow suit 
and raise prices as well. This may indeed be the case, and few would 
argue that tacit collusion (which is generally legal)117 does not occur 
in oligopolistic markets. But this has nothing to do with cross 
ownership. This is an outcome of concentration within the product 
market in which the firms held by the cross-owning institutional 
investors compete. The product market may be conducive to tacit 
collusion, and it may not. If it is, for example, because there are only 
three competitors, market prices will indeed be higher than the 
competitive prices. A firm—any firm, whether or not its shareholders 
cross-own competitors—may indeed attempt to raise prices hoping 
that its competitor will reciprocate. If the product market is not 
conducive to tacit collusion, prices can be expected to be competitive. 
But regardless of what the product market equilibrium is, there is no 
reason to think that managers will forego profit absent a mechanism 
that incentivizes them to do so. The question therefore resonates even 
in the oligopolistic setting—why would managers act in a manner that 
is detrimental to the firm they manage? Several possible explanations 
for this are considered and shown to be unpersuasive. 
A.  Managerial Compensation Linked to Industry Performance 
One answer offered in the literature to this puzzle118 is that 
managers’ performance-based compensation may be linked to 
performance of the industry rather than to performance of the specific 
firm (or the extent to which the specific firm’s performance exceeds 
 
 116. Or by engaging in equivalent conduct, for example, by deteriorating the quality of the 
product, or the like. 
 117. See supra note 79; Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman 
Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 666 (1962); Jonathan B. 
Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and 
Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 145 (1993); Green et al., supra note 
106 (examining the economics literature on tacit collusion in oligopoly markets). But see Posner, 
supra note 65, at 1575. 
 118. E.g., Miguel Antón et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management 
Incentives (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., Working Paper No. 511, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802332. 
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industry performance).119 Specifically, managers may be granted 
stock and options of the firms they manage.120 In an influential article 
on managerial compensation, Bebchuck, Fried, and Walker argue that 
managerial compensation plans are not an outcome of optimal 
contracting, but rather of managerial power.121 Within this framework, 
Bebchuck et al. analyze the phenomenon of granting management 
options to purchase firm stock.122 Bebchuck et al. observe that as a 
result of such a mechanism, managers’ compensation is conditioned 
on absolute share price, rather than on the performance of the stock in 
comparison to other firms’ stock.123 The thrust of Bebchuck et al.’s 
argument is that managers may, through such a mechanism, be 
rewarded for stock-price increases that they did not contribute to.124 
But the observation has important implications in the current setting 
too. 
In the specific context of competition between portfolio firms, 
granting managers stock or options in the firms they manage 
effectively rewards them for the elimination of competition.125 
Eliminating competition will increase all competing firms’ profits, 
including those of the firm under management.126 The value of 
management’s stock will also increase.127 Stock and options thus 
incentivize managers to chill competition.128 This may seemingly 
bring about the anti-competitive conduct envisaged by the recent 
literature. 
But a closer look at such compensation plans reveals that they are 
unlikely to bring about what has been termed here as unilateral 
coordination. Stock and options cannot incentivize unilateral 
coordination of the kind envisaged in the recent literature. In fact, in 
the context of unilateral coordination the competitive effect of stock 
 
 119. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 803–04 (2002). 
 120. Id. at 791–92. 
 121. Id. at 753. 
 122. Id. at 791–93. 
 123. Id. at 802. 
 124. Id. The point is stressed in LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 122 (2004). 
 125. See D. Daniel Sokol & Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Antitrust Corporate Governance and 
Compliance, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 2–5 
(Robert D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 3. 
 128. See id. at 3–5. 
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and options is reversed. Granting managers stock or options in the firm 
they manage creates a disincentive to unilaterally coordinate. If the 
firm unilaterally coordinates, the effect on the price of its own stock 
will be negative. Profits will flow to competitors, whose stock price 
will be positively affected. But the stock price of the unilaterally 
coordinating firm can be expected to plummet. This is a result of the 
simple observation offered earlier and summarized in Table 1. As 
explained, unilateral coordination entails two inseparable elements: 
An increase in total industry profits and the tunneling of these profits 
to a single firm to the detriment of all other industry firms. If 
managers’ compensation is linked to the profitability of their own 
firm, they will try to prevent profits from flowing to competitors. 
Managerial compensation plans granting management stock or 
options in the firm under their management cannot result in unilateral 
coordination. In order to incentivize unilateral coordination, 
compensation must be designed to benefit management when two 
conditions are met: (1) competitors do well, and (2) the firm under 
management performs relatively poorly at the same time. Stock and 
options (of the managed firm) do not accomplish this. 
Moreover, even if stock and options could somehow incentivize 
unilateral coordination, this would have little to do with cross 
ownership. Neither the fact that portfolio firms are cross-owned nor 
the fact that they are cross-owned by several investors (be they lay 
investors or institutional investors) exacerbates any competitive 
concern. A shareholder—any shareholder—benefits from relaxing 
competition between the firm it has holdings in and the firm’s 
competitors. This is the case even if the shareholder holds none of the 
competitors’ stock. A shareholder—again, any shareholder—may 
thus devise a compensation plan that incentivizes management to 
compete less vigorously by explicitly or tacitly coordinating with 
competitors. The shareholder’s holdings in competitors or the lack of 
such holdings do not change the profitability of anti-competitive 
conduct in any way. Consider a shareholder who holds 2 percent of a 
firm’s stock. Suppose that the firm is the only firm in the shareholder’s 
portfolio. The shareholder’s profits will clearly increase if the firm 
forms a cartel. The shareholder will gain 2 percent of every additional 
dollar of profit facilitated by the cartel. If the shareholder splits its 
holdings between portfolio firms, and owns 1 percent of the stock of 
the original firm and 1 percent of the competitor’s stock, the 
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profitability of a cartel between the portfolio firms remains the same. 
Cross ownership does nothing to increase the shareholder’s incentive 
to relax competition. Similarly, the question of whether the stock—be 
it 2 percent of one firm’s stock or 1 percent of each firms’ stock—is 
held by a single investor or by several investors does not in any way 
change the analysis. And indeed, previous scholarly work has 
suggested that compensation plans of this sort may bring about explicit 
coordination as a general matter, regardless of cross ownership.129 
Cross ownership and unilateral coordination are not required for anti-
competitive conduct to be profitable, and they do not increase the 
shareholder’s (or shareholders’) gains from such anti-competitive 
conduct. They cannot exacerbate the problem. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to recommend a specific rule 
to be applied to possible compensation plans that link managers’ 
compensation to the performance of competing firms.130 For current 
purposes, it suffices to acknowledge that such compensation plans are 
undoubtedly a mechanism through which shareholder’ (not 
necessarily cross owners’) incentives to inhibit competition trickle 
down to management. Antitrust law should indeed deal with the 
phenomenon, much like it deals with acquisition of competitors’ 
stock. But importantly for current purposes, this has nothing to do with 
cross ownership or with incentivizing unilateral coordination, and 
therefore does not explain how cross ownership may inhibit 
competition. The recent literature’s reliance on such compensation 
plans as a possible mechanism for incentivizing unilateral 
coordination131 is misplaced. 
 
 129. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 119, at 804. Bebchuck et al. reject the “softening industry 
competition” explanation for granting managers stock and options. But their objection does not 
challenge the economic analysis. Id. Bebchuck et al. reject this explanation mainly because as an 
empirical matter such compensation plans normally link compensation not to specific-industry 
performance but rather to broader price increases. Id. This objection does not imply that such 
compensation plans cannot incentivize managers to soften competition. 
 130. Devising such a rule requires a comprehensive analysis of the potential welfare-enhancing 
effects of such compensation plans and a balancing of these effects against the clear anti-
competitive effects of the plans. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Gershon N. Mandelker, Managerial 
Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions, 42 J. FIN. 823 (1987). A per se 
illegality rule may be appropriate, and a rule of reason may be appropriate—if enough welfare-
enhancing effects are identified—specifically when the industry-performance-dependent 
component of compensation is trivial. See Bebchuck et al., supra note 119 (offering possible ways 
to address the situation in which stock prices are unrelated to managers’ performance). 
 131. See Antón et al., supra note 118; Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1556–57. 
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B.  Future External Remuneration 
A second mechanism that may incentivize management to 
manage the firm in a self-harming manner for the benefit of non-
controlling, passive, cross owners is future external remuneration. The 
term “future external remuneration,” as used here, refers to 
consideration that it occurs outside the realm of the unilaterally 
coordinating firm. The possibility of remuneration within the 
unilaterally coordinating firm, such as support of managers in future 
votes or salary increases, is discussed separately in Section II.C. 
Future external remuneration may take the form of employment 
within the institutional investor’s organization, future employment in 
other firms in which the institutional investor may have holdings, 
lucrative consulting agreements, or any other form of remuneration 
that is detached from the unilaterally coordinating firm. 
1.  The Basic Remuneration Scheme 
At first blush, the basic mechanism seems simple enough: 
Managers act in a manner that benefits the institutional investor. In 
return, the institutional investor rewards the manager with some 
beneficial consideration. For example, after the manager has left the 
company, the institutional investor may hire her as a consultant for a 
hefty fee. 
However, a closer look reveals the shortcomings of this analysis. 
At the outset, recall once again that absent coordination with 
competing firms, serving the institutional investor’s (or institutional 
investors’) interests requires foregoing profit. This, in turn, implies 
that managers are breaching their fiduciary obligations to all other 
shareholders (and other stakeholders, if such a fiduciary duty is 
owed).132 They are simply tunneling133 profits from the firm to the 
institutional shareholder,134 and consequently bearing the risk of civil 
 
 132. See Edward M. Iacobucci, Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Prudential Regulation of 
Financial Institutions, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 183, 186–87 (2015). 
 133. The term “tunneling” is problematic in this context, as tunneling normally describes “the 
transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them.” Simon Johnson 
et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22–27 (2000). In the current context, the benefited entities 
are not controllers. Nonetheless, from the perspective of the effect on the firm, the phenomenon 
discussed here is no different—although, as I argue, unlikely precisely because the benefitted entity 
is not a controller. 
 134. In a recent case before the Israeli District Court in Tel Aviv, a publicly traded firm’s 
controller committed to pay management a specific discretionary bonus if the bonus was not 
granted by the board. The court ruled that officers are not allowed to receive direct remuneration 
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lawsuits and, at times, criminal proceedings, with no immediate 
gain.135 Moreover, if managers’ compensation is in any way linked to 
their own firm’s performance, be it through stock, options, bonuses, 
or other compensation methods, they are in fact paying (in the form of 
lost compensation) for this tunneling scheme.136 Their immediate 
return on this payment is civil and criminal liability. If there is no 
explicit quid pro quo agreement between management and the 
institutional investors for compensation (which would be illegal),137 
the manager’s remuneration is the shareholders’ gratitude and the 
prospect of future consideration.138 
This observation itself does not, of course, make the scenario 
impossible. If the shareholder is a prominent and influential capital 
market player, such gratitude may be valuable.139 But if this is the case, 
unilateral coordination is both implausible, and—far more 
importantly—has nothing to do with cross ownership or with large 
financial interests. Both of these points will be elaborated next. 
Subsequently, two additional complications that cast doubt on the 
probability, and in fact on the very possibility, of such competitive 
harm will be discussed. These final two complications have to do with 
the possibility of market self-correction and the fact that institutional 
investors have divergent holdings in portfolio firms. 
 
from controllers. The rationale for this ruling is precisely the possibility that this will distort 
management’s incentives and cause it to act to the benefit of the controller at the expense of other 
shareholders. DerivC (DC TA) 18994-05-17 De Lange v. Israel Corp., Nevo Legal Database 
(Apr. 30, 2017) (Isr.). 
 135. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (outlining the standards of 
conduct required of directors); see also DerivC (DC TA) 18994-05-17 De Langa v. Israel Corp., 
Nevo Legal Database (Apr. 30, 2017) (Isr.) (serving as an example of the risk of lawsuits managers 
run). See generally G. P. STAPLEDON, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 8–12 (1996) (discussing fiduciary duties directors owe to shareholders and the 
varying interests of the two). 
 136. Once again, managerial compensation dependent on the specific firm’s performance may 
incentivize explicit coordination or tacit collusion. See Abrantes-Metz & Sokol, supra note 125, at 
2. But it will not incentivize unilateral coordination. 
 137. If the quid pro quo is explicit, the manager is discharging its obligations under a clear 
conflict of interest and in breach of its fiduciary duties. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§§ 8.31(a)(2)(i), (iii), (v), 8.42. 
 138. Elhauge, supra note 5, at 1274. 
 139. On the importance of leading capital market players in general, see John E. Core et al., 
Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. 
ECON. 371, 372–73 (1999); Richard M. Cyert et al., Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-
Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence, 48 MGMT. SCI. 453, 453–69 (2002). 
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2.  The Scenario Is Implausible 
Let us begin with the likelihood of the scenario. The likelihood of 
future remuneration is a function of two determinants. First, the 
benefitted shareholder must be expected to deliver on an unspecified, 
unspoken,140 non-binding commitment to make some undetermined 
future payment. This itself does not negate the possibility of future 
remuneration, most importantly because if the institutional investor is 
a repeat player (as most institutional investors are), reputation may 
substitute for enforceability.141 But this is not enough. Obviously, the 
shareholder must also be aware that the manager has acted in a manner 
that was designed to benefit the shareholder at the expense of all other 
stakeholders. At the same time, all other shareholders (as well as all 
other stakeholders) must not realize what is transpiring. The more 
obscure or subtle the conduct, the less likely the benefitted shareholder 
is to realize that the manager has acted in a manner that warrants 
remuneration.142 The more egregious the conduct, the more likely 
other stakeholders (and authorities) are to realize what the manager is 
doing.143 Thus, although this observation does not render the scenario 
impossible, it does cast serious doubt on its likelihood. 
 
 140. The commitment must be unspoken. Otherwise, both the shareholder and management 
will be exposed to criminal sanctions. See supra note 137. 
 141. This may be done for a host of reasons. Importantly, the shareholder may find it valuable 
to obtain a reputation of a shareholder that rewards managers who have furthered its interests. In 
this context, Professor Heymann’s observation, although focusing on reputation in its social 
context, is useful: “At its core, then, reputation is the result of the collective act of judging another 
and the potential use of that result to direct future engagements.” Laura A. Heymann, The Law of 
Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1342 (2011). For a discussion 
of reputation in the business context (although focusing on corporate reputation and employee 
reputation), see Karen S. Cravens & Elizabeth Goad Oliver, Employees: The Key Link of Corporate 
Reputation Management, 49 BUS. HORIZONS 293 (2006). For a formal comprehensive discussion 
of reputation in settings in which players have repeated interactions (as in the current setting), see 
GEORGE J. MAILATH & LARRY SAMUELSON, REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATIONS: LONG-RUN 
RELATIONSHIPS (2006). 
 142. Management may be able to bring its conduct to the attention of the shareholder. But it is 
in the manager’s interest to claim that it has acted to the benefit of the shareholder (and the 
detriment of other stakeholders) regardless of whether or not this is true. This makes the manager’s 
report to the shareholder less credible. 
 143. Other shareholders’ financial interest in detecting such breaches may be small. But the 
possibility of filing a class action—and receiving the monetary consideration as class plaintiff—
should provide enough incentives to detect the breach and pursue an action. In this context, it is 
important to recall that the setting becomes more conducive to unilateral coordination as the 
controller’s financial interest in the unilaterally coordinating company decreases, implying that 
other shareholders will find it even more appealing to act. Not surprisingly, the case cited by Rock 
& Rubinfeld, supra note 1 as the only case alleging such conduct—In re Domestic Airline Travel 
Antitrust Litigation, 221 F. Supp. 3d 46 (D.D.C. 2016)—is a class action. In any event, authorities 
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3.  The Scenario Has Nothing to Do with Cross Ownership 
Far more important than the likelihood of the scenario, is the fact 
that this scenario has very little to do with cross ownership or with 
large financial interests. The shareholder in question need not be the 
controlling shareholder, or even a large shareholder, of the unilaterally 
coordinating firm. The prerequisite for this scenario is only that the 
benefitted shareholder be a prominent figure. In fact, on closer 
examination, the smaller the financial stakes the shareholder has in the 
unilaterally coordinating firm, the more profitable and likely unilateral 
coordination becomes. The institutional investor’s holdings in the 
unilaterally coordinating firm make unilateral coordination less 
profitable, easier to detect, and easier to punish. Cross ownership is an 
obstacle to unilateral coordination. 
To see why, let the following setting be considered: BlackRock, 
a leading institutional investor, holds 0.5 percent of firm A’s 
outstanding stock and 3 percent of firm B’s outstanding stock. Firm 
A’s CEO decides to raise firm A’s prices to an unprofitable level so 
that profits flow to firm B, to BlackRock’s benefit. This scenario is 
one of the scenarios envisioned by advocates of the anti-competitive 
theory of harm brought about by cross ownership. 
First, the ploy is more profitable for BlackRock the smaller its 
holdings in firm A. The profitability of the scheme is a function of the 
difference in BlackRock’s holdings in the unilaterally coordinating 
firm and in the firm to which profits flow. For any level of holding in 
the competing firm (firm B), if BlackRock’s holdings drop to zero in 
the unilaterally coordinating firm (firm A), its profits are 
maximized.144 
Second, if BlackRock is not a shareholder of the unilaterally 
coordinating firm, the scheme becomes much more difficult to detect, 
if not practically undetectable. If BlackRock is a shareholder of firm 
A, other stakeholders of the firm or authorities are likely to be alarmed 
by a business decision that turns out to be harmful to the firm, when 
another firm held by BlackRock reports increased earnings at the same 
 
and criminal sanctions, which are probably an even greater deterrent than civil action, definitely 
become more likely as the conduct becomes more questionable. 
 144. In the numeric example used here, BlackRocks’ profits are increased by 0.5 cents for every 
dollar that flows to firm B as a result of the scheme. Rather than 2.5 cents for every dollar of profit 
flowing to firm B (3%–0.5%=2.5%), it will earn 3 cents for every such dollar (3%–0%). The 
profitability of the scheme for BlackRock will have increased by 20%. 
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time. Even if the precise scheme is unclear, red flags will be raised. 
The scheme is far less conspicuous if BlackRock is not a shareholder 
of the unilaterally coordinating firm at all.145 This is not to suggest that 
detection is always immediate if BlackRock is a shareholder of firm 
A. But the unilaterally coordinating manager is better off if BlackRock 
is not a shareholder at all. 
Finally, in jurisdictions in which shareholders owe fiduciary 
duties to each other,146 BlackRock itself, not only management, may 
be breaching its fiduciary duties as a shareholder to other shareholders 
of the unilaterally coordinating firm if the firm unilaterally 
coordinates. 
For the preceding reasons, cross ownership is detrimental to the 
scheme. If BlackRock holds no shares of the unilaterally coordinating 
firm, the scheme is far more profitable, detection is much less likely, 
and both management’s risk and BlackRock’s risk (when a fiduciary 
duty is owed by shareholders) are significantly mitigated. At the same 
time, BlackRock may still realize that the strategy was designed for its 
benefit and reward the manager in the future. 
Ultimately, the theory boils down to an argument that a firm’s 
management may devise a strategy that, while in breach of the 
managers’ fiduciary duties, tunnels funds to an influential figure, for 
no immediate benefit, but with hope of future reward. An influential 
entity’s gratitude may definitely be valuable. And although 
prohibited,147 managers may indeed breach their obligations to other 
stakeholders if they have the opportunity to self-serve. But even if this 
is somehow likely absent an agreement, or at least an explicit 
 
 145. If BlackRock is not a shareholder, management’s conduct is far more likely to be 
effectively protected under the business judgment rule than if shareholders’ conflicting interests 
are observed. On the business judgment rule, see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 
693, 697–98, 746–48 (Del. Ch. 2005); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812–13 (Del. 1984), 
overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 146. The fiduciary duties that may be owed in closely held corporations, see, e.g., Hagshenas 
v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), are, of course, irrelevant to the current setting. But 
in some jurisdictions, fiduciary duties may be owed by controlling shareholders of publicly traded 
corporations as well. See Frank Martin Laprade, Eur. Parliament, Directorate-Gen. for Internal 
Pol’ys, Rights and Obligations of Shareholders: National Regimes and Proposed 
Instruments at EU Level for Improving Legal Efficiency, at 30 (May 2012), https://www.europarl.
europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/juri/dv/pe462463_/pe462463_en.pdf; § 192(a), 
Companies Law, 5759–1999 (Isr.), https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/ 
CompaniesLaw57591999.pdf; Joseph Gross, Trends in the Duties of Holders of Control in a 
Company, 1 A Mishpat Va’Asakim 271 (2004). 
 147. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.31(a)(2)(i), (iii), (v), 8.42 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
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understanding, it has very little to do with cross ownership in the 
industry. In fact, cross ownership is detrimental to this kind of 
conduct. 
4.  The Scenario Is Frustrated by Capital Market Players’ Expected 
Response 
A third important point in this respect is one made by Rock and 
Rubinfeld. Even if unilateral coordination were likely, the market 
would presumably self-correct.148 Recall, once again, that the scenario 
envisaged is one in which the institutional investors who the 
unilaterally coordinating firm or firms set out to please do not control 
these firms. This in turn suggests that the unilaterally coordinating 
firms present a lucrative investment opportunity. As Rock and 
Rubinfeld state: “Without control, any sacrifice of firm profits out of 
deference to a shareholder’s other holdings will provide a profitable 
investment opportunity for a shareholder that thinks it can shift the 
strategy back towards maximizing single firm value.”149 
Importantly, a potential shareholder that identified this 
investment opportunity need not even engage in a takeover battle or 
attempt to control the firm. As unilateral coordination is wasteful 
(from the unilaterally coordinating firm’s perspective), all other 
shareholders would benefit from discontinuing such unilateral 
coordination. And as the benefitted shareholder is not a controlling 
shareholder, it would be enough for the investor identifying unilateral 
coordination (or otherwise suboptimal bad management) to buy any 
amount of stock, explain the situation to other shareholders who have 
no cross holdings in the industry or whose holdings are larger in the 
unilaterally coordinating firm, and make a profit by discontinuing the 
practice. If unilateral coordination occurred, this would clearly attract 
activist investors, whose task would be easier than usual.150 They 
could simply purchase stock and draw other shareholders’ attention to 
the fact that profits had been tunneled. The market could be expected 
to swiftly self-correct. 
 
 148. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 251. 
 149. Id. 
 150. For an account of activist investors’ involvement in firms’ conduct, see Michal Barzuza 
& Eric L. Talley, Long-Term Bias (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 449, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3338631. 
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5.  The Opposing Interests of Institutional Investors Safeguard 
Against Competitive Harm 
A final shortcoming of the anti-competitive theory has to do with 
the divergent holdings of institutional investors. Portfolio firms are 
cross-owned by several institutional investors with different holdings 
in each firm. This is a fatal blow to the possibility of competitive harm. 
The reason is that if each institutional investor’s stake in the competing 
firms is different, each investor will prefer that a different firm be the 
unilaterally coordinating firm. Investors want profits to flow to the 
firm in which their own holdings are greatest. Each institutional 
investor’s preference will thus depend on its individual difference in 
holdings and may therefore be very different from other institutional 
investors’ preferences. If investor X, a cross owner of firms A and B, 
has larger holdings in firm A than in firm B, and investor Y, a second 
cross owner, has larger holdings in firm B than in firm A, portfolio 
firms’ managements will be deadlocked even if they have made the 
decision to engage in this form of tunneling. To understand how 
limiting this is to the theory of competitive harm, it is helpful to note 
that in all of the industries surveyed in the recent literature, a conflict 
of interests among institutional shareholders would severely challenge 
any hope of unilateral coordination. 
The pharmaceutical industry, which is presented by Azar et al. as 
an illustrative industry conducive to unilateral coordination, 
demonstrates this neatly.151 According to Azar et al., in the pharmacy 
industry, the five largest institutional investors who hold stock in CVS 
are BlackRock, Fidelity, Vanguard, State Street, and Wellington.152 
They hold a total of slightly less than 25 percent of CVS’s stock.153 
The same institutional investors also hold approximately 19.55 
percent of Walgreens’ stock.154 Assuming the product market is 
relatively concentrated, the hypothesis is that industry firms’ 
managements will act to further the interests of these shareholders at 
the expense of other shareholders. However, once the joint holdings 
of the three largest institutional investors are broken down by investor, 
it becomes clear that if management were to attempt to serve these 
 
 151. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1515 tbl.1. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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investors it would, absent explicit coordination, find itself baffled. The 
respective holdings are elaborated in the following table: 
 
Table 2155 
Investor Holdings in CVS Holdings in Walgreen 
BlackRock 5.9% 4.44% 
Fidelity 5.1% 3.07% 
Vanguard 4.78% 5.26% 
 
BlackRock and Fidelity hold approximately 6 percent and 5 
percent of CVS’s stock, respectively, and approximately 4.5 percent 
and 3 percent of Walgreens’ stock, respectively. They both have a 
strong preference for profits to flow from Walgreens to CVS. But 
Vanguard holds 4.78 percent of CVS’s shares and 5.26 percent of 
Walgreens’ shares. Vanguard thus prefers that profits flow to 
Walgreens. If CVS were to unilaterally coordinate (i.e., unprofitably 
raise its own prices to the benefit of Walgreens), BlackRock and 
Fidelity would have lost. If Walgreens were to do the same, Vanguard 
would have lost. 
Under these circumstances, unilateral coordination is even less 
likely. It is difficult to decide which influential institutional investor 
to serve and which to harm. Furthermore, even if management 
somehow makes this decision, a problem of detection emerges. Unlike 
serving an influential shareholder when all other shareholders are 
dispersed, lay retail investors, who have neither the incentives nor the 
ability to monitor performance,156 in the current setting there will 
always be a professional (institutional) shareholder with significant 
holdings that has been harmed. This shareholder is as likely to realize 
that it has been harmed as the benefitted shareholder is to realize that 
it has been benefitted. And since the harmed shareholder has 
significant holdings in the unilaterally coordinating firm, it is much 
more likely to take action. 
 
 155. Id. (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the article). 
 156. Although, as suggested earlier, there are mechanisms—most notably the class action 
mechanism, that can be expected to offset shareholder indifference—specifically in the current 
setting. See supra note 143. 
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Again, institutional investors may coordinate between themselves 
and agree that profits should flow to CVS, where their joint holdings 
(25 percent) are greater than their joint holdings in Walgreens (19.55 
percent).157 BlackRock and Fidelity, who will have gained from this, 
will have gained more than Vanguard will have lost. As the net effect 
of this unilateral coordination is positive (from the cross owners’ joint 
perspective), the losing party can be compensated. But this requires 
both explicit coordination at the investors’ level, which would be a 
criminal offense, and some method through which the joint decision 
is conveyed to management (which would, in turn, be violating its own 
duties). As Hemphill and Kahan explain, intervening with firm 
conduct at such a level would be extremely conspicuous.158 In any 
event, the structural incentives created by horizontal shareholdings 
cannot spontaneously result in unilateral coordination. 
A similar problem emerges when considering the second industry 
with concentrated ownership that is provided by the recent literature 
as an example of the effects of cross ownership—the banking industry. 
Here too, according to Azar et al., the six largest investors hold 
approximately 24 percent of JP Morgan Chase, 20 percent of Bank of 
America, and over 33 percent of Citigroup. But when these holdings 





 157. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1515 tbl.1 (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the 
article). 
 158. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1444–45. 
 159. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1515 tbl.1 (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the 
article). 
Investor Holdings in 
JP Morgan 
Chase 




BlackRock 6.7% 5.38% 9.29% 
Fidelity 3.16% 2.56% 3.83% 
Vanguard 4.78% 4.51% 4.4% 
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Any unilateral coordination that benefits BlackRock and Fidelity 
will be harmful to Vanguard, and vice versa. This industry is even 
more problematic than the pharmaceutical industry because the 
industry is comprised of three banks. Therefore, two banks would need 
to unilaterally coordinate for each investor to benefit from such 
conduct. Both JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America would need to 
unprofitably raise their prices so that Citigroup could enjoy supra-
competitive returns. This requires even more elaborate coordination 
and is therefore even less likely to occur absent explicit coordination 
amongst investors and explicit instructions to management. 
The argument is slightly less immediate in the third industry 
presented by Azar et al., the technology industry. The largest 
shareholders jointly hold approximately 20 percent of Apple, and 27 
percent of Microsoft.160 All three joint institutional investors—
BlackRock, Fidelity and Vanguard—have greater stakes in Microsoft, 




Investor Holdings in Apple Holdings in Microsoft 
BlackRock 5.58% 5.33% 
Fidelity 3.28% 3.08% 
Vanguard 4.95% 4.49% 
 
Although their holdings in Apple are only slightly greater than 
their holdings in Microsoft, BlackRock, Vanguard, and Fidelity 
undoubtedly all prefer profits to flow to Apple. But Microsoft’s third-
largest shareholder is, according to Azar et al., Bill Gates, who holds 
4.52 percent of Microsoft’s stock. Bill Gates holds none of Apple’s 
stock, and therefore clearly has an extremely strong preference for 
profits to flow to Microsoft.162 It is unlikely, and then some, that 
Microsoft will unilaterally coordinate. Any dollar unilaterally lost to 
Apple implies an almost five cent loss to Microsoft’s third largest 
shareholder (Bill Gates). The benefit to Microsoft’s three other large 
 
 160. Id. (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the article). 
 161. Id. (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the article). 
 162. Id. 
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shareholders is approximately one cent in total.163 It is similarly 
unlikely that Apple will act to the detriment of its largest shareholders 
to the benefit of Bill Gates, who has no holdings in Apple.164 Once 
again, shareholders may coordinate price, quantities, or other 
competitive dimensions, and then notify managements of their 
decisions. Alternatively, they may agree that it is worthwhile to have 
one firm unilaterally raise its prices to the benefit of the other firm. 
But they would then need to agree on payments to be made by the 
shareholder or shareholders benefitting from this unilateral 
coordination to the shareholders or shareholder losing from it (and, 
once again, at minimum, inform management of the unilaterally 
coordinating firm of their decision). These compensation schemes are, 
given the differences in holdings, extremely complex, and can be 
expected to require elaborate formulae and lengthy negotiations. 
Absent explicit (illegal) coordination, this is extremely unlikely. 
A similar coordination problem emerges in all of the industries 
surveyed by Posner et al. as oligopolistic industries in which there are 
significant cross ownership patterns. In the mobile phone industry 
there are four major competitors—AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and 
Sprint.165 When looking at institutional investors’ holdings in each of 
these competitors, it is clear that they have completely opposing (and 
very strong) preferences. Vanguard, BlackRock, and Capital Group’s 
stakes in Verizon are larger than their stakes in any other company in 
the industry.166 They would clearly insist that profits flow to Verizon. 
Evercore is invested only in AT&T and would thus lose if profits were 
to flow to any other competitor.167 Deutsche Telekom holds slightly 
more than 65 percent of T-Mobile (with no holdings in any other 
competitor), and SoftBank holds nearly 83 percent of Sprint’s stock, 
 
 163. I limit the analysis to the three largest shareholders for consistency, as these are the same 
investors previously considered. If one looks at these shareholders alone, total gains from unilateral 
coordination are less than one cent (0.25+0.46+0.2=0.91). However, such conduct by Microsoft 
will yield a total benefit of slightly more than one cent to its large shareholders, because the fourth 
largest shareholder, State Street, holds 4.59 percent of Apple and 4.39 percent of Microsoft, so an 
additional 0.2 cents will accrue to a large shareholder. This, however, does not change the analysis. 
Bill Gates will have lost approximately five cents, for a benefit of 1.11 cents divided among four 
other shareholders. 
 164. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1515 tbl.1. 
 165. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 726. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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with no holding in any other competitor.168 Absent explicit 
coordination between Deutsche Telekom, Vanguard, BlackRock, 
SoftBank, and Evercore, it is extremely difficult to unilaterally 
coordinate. The breakfast cereal, aluminum, and cooking-stoves 
industries all demonstrate similar holding patterns.169 In each of these 
industries different influential shareholders can be expected to have 
contradicting (and strong) preferences with respect to where profits 
should flow to. 
Finally, the airline industry, the second industry analyzed by Azar 
et al., also exhibits a holding pattern that makes unilateral coordination 
unlikely.170 Rock and Rubinfeld reformat the data on institutional 
investors’ holdings in the airline industry as a spreadsheet.171 A quick 
glance at this spreadsheet shows that the largest shareholder in each of 
the six major airlines is almost always different from the largest 
shareholder in the other airlines: Delta Air Lines’ largest shareholder 
is Berkshire Hathaway; Southwest Airlines Co.’s largest shareholder 
is PRIMECAP; American Airlines’ largest shareholder is T. Rowe 
Price; United Continental Holdings’ largest shareholders are 
BlackRock and Berkshire Hathaway (each with 9.2 percent of 
Continental’s stock); Alaska Air’s largest shareholder is T. Rowe 
Price; and JetBlue Airways’ largest shareholder is Vanguard.172  
Absent explicit coordination, it is impossible to see how unilateral 
coordination may have occurred. 
In the airline industry, the idea of unilateral coordination is even 
more perplexing. In addition to the very different holdings, Rock and 
Rubinfeld also show that holdings in the airline industry changed 
dramatically over time.173 A quick glance at this spreadsheet shows 
that the largest shareholder in each of the six major airlines is almost 
always different from the largest shareholder in the other airlines: 
Delta Air Lines’ largest shareholder is Berkshire Hathaway; 
Southwest Airlines Co.’s largest shareholder is PRIMECAP; 
American Airlines’ largest shareholder is T. Rowe Price; United 
Continental Holdings’ largest shareholders are BlackRock and 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 727–28. 
 170. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1516 tbl.1. 
 171. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 234 tbl.1A. 
 172. Id. (numbers were taken from an earlier version of the article). 
 173. Id. at 235 tbl.2. 
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Berkshire Hathaway (each with 9.2 percent of Continental’s stock); 
Alaska Air’s largest shareholder is T. Rowe Price; and JetBlue 
Airways’ largest shareholder is Vanguard. Absent explicit 
coordination, it is impossible to see how unilateral coordination may 
have occurred. 
In the airline industry, the idea of unilateral coordination is even 
more perplexing. In addition to the very different holdings, Rock and 
Rubinfeld also show that holdings in the airline industry changed 
dramatically over time.174 Changes in holdings would further 
complicate unilateral coordination, as the unilaterally coordinating 
firm would need to constantly change, depending on the firm in which 
institutional shareholders’ (joint) holdings were largest at any given 
point in time.175 Although data for other industries are not presented, 
the general point is extremely relevant to all industries. Institutional 
investors constantly change the balance of their portfolios, thereby 
altering the relative impact of each portfolio firm on overall 
profitability. Any change in the portfolio impacts the profitability of 
the scheme and will require renegotiation of payments made by one 
institutional investor to the others. When any institutional investor’s 
holdings in a specific portfolio firm become larger than its holdings in 
another portfolio firm, the whole scheme may need to be renegotiated, 
and the unilaterally coordinating firm may need to be changed. 
Perhaps counter intuitively, cross ownership of portfolio firms by 
several institutional investors actually safeguards against spontaneous 
competitive harm. 
C.  Future Internal Remuneration 
“Future internal remuneration” refers to any remuneration the 
unilaterally coordinating manager expects to receive within the 
unilaterally coordinating firm. For example, the manager may expect 
to receive the institutional investors’ support for future salary 
increases, generous bonuses, or approval of other suggestions made 
by the manager. Without loss of generality, we may think of this kind 
of remuneration as taking the form of support in future votes. The 
analysis developed in the previous section must be slightly altered to 
fit this kind of remuneration. But the basic result remains the same. 
 
 174. Id. at 235 tbl.2. 
 175. Id. at 236. 
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In the previous setting of external remuneration it was shown that 
holdings in the unilaterally coordinating firm (by the benefitted 
institutional investor) is redundant, and in fact harmful to the scheme. 
The holding was superfluous, because management could tunnel 
profits to the firm in which the institutional investor has a financial 
interest even if the institutional investor has no holdings in the 
unilaterally coordinating firm. And the grateful institutional investor 
could then reward management in the future with a generous 
consulting agreement or the like. There was no need for the 
institutional investor to hold stock of the unilaterally coordinating firm 
at all. As explained, holding in the unilaterally coordinating company 
was in fact harmful because it made the scheme less profitable, more 
likely to be detected, and potentially exposed the institutional investor 
to sanctions for breach of its own duties (when such are owed). 
By contrast, if the reward to managers is to take the form of 
support in future votes, holdings in the unilaterally coordinating firm 
are essential, at least at the stage when management receives its 
“payment.” If the institutional investor has no holdings in the 
unilaterally coordinating firm, it cannot support management in votes. 
However, the previous observations still hold: The scheme is still 
less profitable due to the institutional investor’s holding in the 
unilaterally coordinating firm; the risk of detection is greater; and the 
institutional investor itself may be liable for breach of its own duties 
(in jurisdictions where shareholders owe fiduciary duties to other 
shareholders). It would therefore generally be preferable for the 
institutional investor to purchase equity of the unilaterally 
coordinating firm after unilateral coordination had occurred rather 
than before management unilaterally coordinates. The institutional 
shareholder would then purchase equity after the stock had 
depreciated in value due to the tunneling of profits to the competing 
firm, rather than hold the unilaterally coordinating firm’s stock as it 
depreciated in value. This would also make detection far less likely. 
Cross ownership at the time of unilateral coordination is still 
unnecessary and harmful (due to the increased risk of detection). The 
stock can be purchased at a later stage. 
But even if, for whatever reason, the benefitted institutional 
investor had to hold equity of the unilaterally coordinating firm before 
management unilaterally coordinated, the other objections to the 
hypothesis would remain relevant: Other institutional investors whose 
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holdings in the unilaterally coordinating firm were greater than their 
holdings in the firm to which profits flowed would likely retaliate 
against managers that harmed them. Even if these investors did not file 
a lawsuit or file complaints with the authorities, they could be 
expected to vote against management in future votes. And since the 
setting envisaged is one in which the benefitted shareholder is a 
shareholder with relatively small holdings in the unilaterally 
coordinating firm, the net effect on future voting will regularly be 
negative from management’s perspective. The benefitted shareholder 
is, by definition, the shareholder whose holdings are small (relative to 
its other holdings), whereas all shareholders whose holdings are 
greater in the unilaterally coordinating firm will have been alienated. 
As the data in tables 2, 3, and 4 suggest, such a strategy would not 
have been a profitable strategy (from management’s perspective) in 
any of the industries for which data are offered in the recent literature. 
The would-be alienated shareholders’ holdings far exceed those of the 
would-be grateful shareholders. 
Additionally, Rock and Rubinfeld’s observation regarding the 
possibility of self-correction by the market makes any such plan even 
less likely to succeed.176 Even if the harmed institutional investors do 
not retaliate against management at their own initiative, any investor 
that noticed that the unilaterally coordinating firm was 
underperforming would find it to be a lucrative investment, and could 
easily purchase stock with a view to replacing management or altering 
its conduct (recall, again, that the benefitted shareholder is not a 
controlling shareholder). Once again, as mentioned, this investor 
could then quite easily persuade those investors that management had 
wronged to join it in outvoting management. Importantly, the investor 
need not even purchase a significant share of the unilaterally 
coordinating firm’s equity (although this might be a profitable 
strategy, as the stock would be underpriced). In all of the industries 
surveyed, unilateral coordination harms investors that hold a larger 
share of the firm’s equity than the potentially benefitted shareholder. 
Thus, there would be no need for a hostile takeover, major purchases 
by activist investors, or the like. Simply acquiring some equity and 
drawing shareholders’ attention to what had transpired would be 
enough. And, of course, this will have been profitable for the activist 
 
 176. See id. at 251. 
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investor, who will have bought the equity at the lower price and could 
sell it once the unilateral coordination was discontinued. 
Therefore, although support in future votes, or future internal 
remuneration, is slightly different from other forms of consideration, 
on closer examination this does not alter the analysis significantly. 
Such forms of remuneration indeed require the investor to which 
profits are tunneled to hold equity of the unilaterally coordinating firm 
at some point. But this form of consideration too does not require 
holdings at the time of the unilateral coordination. And in this setting 
too, it seems more profitable and less risky for the benefitted 
shareholder to purchase stock post-coordination. In this setting too, 
there is no reason to think that cross ownership causes, facilitates, or 
even streamlines unilateral coordination. 
III.  THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
As mentioned, the influential research by Azar et al., which is the 
cornerstone of the recent theories of competitive harm, found 
empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that institutional 
investors’ cross  ownership dampens competition. Analyzing the 
airline industry, Azar et al. identify a positive effect of common 
ownership on ticket prices.177 They use a measurement of 
concentration that incorporates ownership-concentration into the 
concentration-measurement of an industry—the MHHI.178 Azar et al. 
use a measurement of the effect of common ownership (“MHHI∆”), 
developed by O’Brien and Salop.179 They exploit BlackRock’s 
acquisition of Barclays Global Investors to confirm the results and find 
that “ticket prices are approximately 3% to 7% higher in the average 
U.S. airline route than would be the case under separate ownership.”180 
This would seem to support the recent theory of competitive 
harm. However, Azar et al.’s methodology has been challenged by 
several subsequent writers.181 
 
 177. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1517, 1523–49. 
 178. Id. at 1532 tbl.4. The MHHI is a modified HHI. On the basic HHI, see supra note 25. 
 179. Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1519. 
 180. Id. at 1517. 
 181. See O’Brien & Waehrer, supra note 44, at 25–26; Gramlich & Grundl, supra note 50, at 
5; Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 223, 229–51; Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1397–
98. 
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First, the use of MHHI∆, as well as any HHI-type measurement 
(which Gramlich and Grundl denote as GHHI—General HHI),182 
suffers from potential endogeneity problems. This is the case because 
quantities cleared by the market, which the HHI uses to measure 
concentration, are a function, inter alia, of market concentration183 and 
because ownership shares are not strictly an independent variable. 
Ownership shares (MHHI—the independent variable used by Azar et 
al.) are dependent, inter alia, on factors other than common ownership, 
which affect both price and MHHI.184 Therefore, the relationship 
between price and MHHI may be a function of these factors. Gramlich 
and Grundl themselves, when controlling for the endogeneity 
problem, find mixed results.185 
Second, Rock and Rubinfeld argue that the change in 
concentration in holdings that resulted from BlackRock’s merger with 
BGI (from around 3 percent each to 6 percent) is, from a theoretical 
perspective, an implausible explanation for the price increase.186 They 
also discuss additional possible events that may have triggered the 
price increase, arguing that these are not controlled for in the Azar et 
al. research.187 
Third, Rock and Rubinfeld argue that the timing of the “natural 
shock”—BlackRock’s merger with BGI—coincides with at least two 
or three other potentially powerful explanations for the price 
increase.188 The merger occurred in 2009, a year after Delta’s 
acquisition of Northwest airlines, and when the adverse effects of the 
2008 recession were diminishing.189 Also, in 2010, one year following 
the merger, United acquired Continental.190 Rock and Rubinfeld 
suggest that these mergers may have increased product quality, which 
in turn might imply that quality-adjusted prices stayed constant or 
even decreased.191 Alternatively, even if quality-adjusted prices 
 
 182. Gramlich & Grundl, supra note 50, at 2. 
 183. Id. at 2–3. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Gramlich & Grundl, supra note 50, at 3, 19–29. Rock & Rubinfeld note that Azar et al. 
comment on the endogeneity, but do not offer instrumental variables to control for this. See Rock 
& Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 242. 
 186. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 242–43. 
 187. Id. at 243. 
 188. Id. at 243–44. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 244. 
 191. Id. 
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indeed increased, this could have been a result of increased product-
market concentration (attributable to mergers within the product 
market), rather than of increased concentration at the shareholder 
level.192 Ultimately, Rock and Rubinfeld “find unconvincing Azar et 
al.’s evidence suggesting that increased ticket prices were due to the 
BlackRock/BGI merger rather than these alternative, highly plausible, 
explanations.”193 
Finally, Hemphill and Kahan point to a mismatch between the 
empirical evidence and the underlying theories of competitive harm. 
They offer a typology that distinguishes between potential 
mechanisms along three different dimensions and show that at least 
some of the potential mechanisms are not supported by the empirical 
findings.194 They too find “the case for broad reform unproven”195 and 
that there is “a persistent gap in our empirical understanding of 
common ownership, namely direct evidence about the ‘who, where, 
when, and how’ that [concentrated common owners] employ.”196 
In addition to the empirical gap that has already been identified, 
the insights offered in this Article suggest that the empirical findings 
supporting the theory of competitive harm are problematic from 
another important perspective. As explained, compensation 
mechanisms linking managerial compensation to industry 
performance by granting managers stock and options cannot 
incentivize unilateral coordination. They can, however, incentivize 
outright cartelistic conduct.197 Consequently, if the validity of the 
recent theory of competitive harm is to be tested empirically, 
industries in which managerial compensation typically includes a 
significant portion of stock and options must be distinguished from 
industries in which such compensation is insignificant. Only supra-
competitive pricing observed in the latter case may lend support to the 
theory. Supra-competitive pricing in industries in which managerial 
compensation is linked to the firm’s performance may only lend 
support to traditional theories of competitive harm. However, Azar et 
al. did not collect data on performance-based compensation of 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1399. 
 195. Id. at 1450. 
 196. Id. at 1440. 
 197. See sources cited in supra notes 128–31. 
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management in the industry.198 In line with current theory, the authors 
considered industry-linked performance-based compensation to be 
one of several mechanisms through which shareholders may 
incentivize management to compete less vigorously by unilaterally 
coordinating.199 Even if such mechanisms are identified, their 
prevalence in the industry is a key determinant of their potential to 
induce unilateral coordination.200 This significantly widens the gap 
between the empirical evidence collected by Azar et al. and the 
underlying theory, a gap that Hemphill and Kahn have already pointed 
to.201 
As mentioned, Kennedy et al. attempt to address the issues 
identified with Azar et al.’s research. They apply a different approach 
to the same industry, substituting indices of common ownership 
incentives for concentration measures.202 Attempting to construct the 
same dataset, they find no evidence that common ownership raises 
prices.203 
The tentative conclusion to be drawn from the current state of the 
empirical research is that the most recent empirical findings support 
the theory developed in this Article (and are supported by it), casting 
serious doubt on the recent theory of competitive harm. This 
conclusion is, as suggested, tentative, and should be taken with a grain 
 
 198. See Azar et al., supra note 5, at 1556–60. 
 199. Id. at 1556, 1558–60. 
 200. The predictions suggested by this Article are in fact very nuanced regarding how common 
such mechanisms must be in an industry to induce unilateral coordination. Even if a mechanism 
that links managerial compensation to industry-wide performance—and detaches compensation 
from firm-specific performance—is introduced, the prevalence of this mode of compensation in the 
industry must also be considered. Perhaps counter-intuitively, industry-wide linkage of 
performance-based compensation to industry performance will not incentivize unilateral 
coordination. The reason is that all of the firms in which such a compensation mechanism is in 
place are incentivized to unilaterally coordinate. Therefore, if all firms in the industry have such 
compensation plans in place, each will try to raise its price above that of the competing firms, and 
industry prices will be too high, resulting in lost profit. Industry-wide prevalence of industry-
performance-dependent compensation will result in a race to the top (from a price perspective), or 
to the bottom (from an overall profit perspective). Industry-wide prevalence of such compensation 
plans will, however, incentivize cartelistic behavior. Managers will have an interest in reaching an 
anti-competitive agreement with their competitors (to the benefit of shareholders), as their profits 
are maximized if total industry profits are maximized. It is only when some firms in the industry 
have such compensation plans in place that unilateral coordination is plausible. Any empirical 
research attempting to ascertain the validity of the theory must be sensitive to this observation. See 
Abrantes-Metz & Sokol, supra note 125. 
 201. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1410. 
 202. Kennedy et al., supra note 1, at 4. 
 203. Id. 
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of salt. The empirical findings are controversial, and this controversy 
has attracted quite some attention,204 resulting in “diametrically 
opposed results.”205 Ultimately, while the most recent empirical 
studies indeed support the argument pressed in this Article, it seems 
that the most compelling conclusion regarding the empirical results is 
Rock and Rubinfeld’s conclusion that “[t]here is more work to be 
done,”206 echoed by Hemphill and Kahan’s call for more calibrated 
empirical research.207 
IV.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Following the now widely accepted analysis according to which 
cross ownership of firms in oligopolistic product markets 
spontaneously results in supra-competitive pricing, antitrust doctrine 
has been called on to combat such cross ownership. The argument is 
that such cross ownership should be considered to run afoul of section 
7 of the Clayton Act.208 To that end, interpretations and analyses of 
the “investment-only” exemption afforded by the HSR have been 
advanced, arguing that when the relevant transaction-size and firm-
size thresholds are met, acquisitions of oligopolistic firms’ stock by 
cross owning institutional investors should be subject to ex ante 
antitrust scrutiny.209 
The analysis developed in this Article shows that this recent 
theory misses the mark. Cross ownership by institutional investors 
does not, in and of itself, harm competition in any way. However, the 
policy implications of the analysis offered in this Article require an 
additional step. The conclusion that antitrust law should not deal with 
the phenomenon at all does not automatically follow. The reason is 
that even if such cross ownership cannot incentivize unilateral 
coordination, it may nonetheless incentivize different anti-competitive 
conduct. If that is the case, there may be reason to condemn it. 
 
 204. See Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 242 (addressing a potential solution that Azar et 
al. offer to the endogeneity problem and explaining why they do not find the solution compelling); 
Gramlich & Grundl, supra note 50, at 2 n.1 (discussing additional empirical studies with 
contradicting results); Heung Jin Kwon, Executive Compensation Under Common Ownership 1 
(Nov. 29, 2016), http://fmaconferences.org/Boston/ExecutiveCompensationunderCommonOwner
ship.pdf (unpublished paper); Antón et al., supra note 118, at 50. 
 205. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 247. 
 206. Id. at 245. 
 207. See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1441. 
 208. Rock & Rubinfeld, supra note 1, at 222. 
 209. Id. at 274–77. 
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Specifically, although shareholders’ preference for lax product-market 
competition cannot trickle down to management through the holding 
structure, cross ownership may still theoretically incentivize explicit 
coordination. Merger control is, as mentioned, designed to preempt 
potential harm to competition.210 Therefore, stock acquisitions that 
incentivize managements to inhibit competition may justifiably be 
blocked. 
The problem, however, is that application of antitrust law to 
passive cross ownership has a significant social cost on the one hand 
and is redundant in addressing the actual competitive concerns on the 
other. Additionally, coordination is neither alleged, nor likely, as 
demonstrated by Hemphill and Kahan.211 Disallowing mergers based 
on the new theories of competitive harm is thus an attempt to address 
a very rare (and possibly merely theoretical) phenomenon with a blunt 
tool, the costs of which far exceed its benefits. 
First, it is extremely unlikely that institutional investors act as 
cartel ringmasters. Hemphill and Kahan review the modus operandi of 
institutional investors, and explain that the generation of, transmission 
of, and inducement to follow a cartelistic strategy is complex.212 There 
are several reasons for this. To begin with, the institutional investors 
that are identified in the literature on anti-competitive effects of 
common ownership are, with few exceptions, comprised of different 
business entities.213 Each of these institutional investors is treated in 
the literature as a single entity, because their holdings are reported to 
the SEC on a consolidated basis214 and through the same legal 
entity.215 However, from a business perspective, these are multi-
layered structures with divergent interests.216 Their investment, 
recommendation, and voting operations are conducted by fund 
portfolio managers, analysts, and centralized voting units.217 Fund 
portfolio managers make investment decisions for the funds they 
manage, and each fund portfolio manager is incentivized to increase 
 
 210. See supra note 86. 
 211. See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1409. 
 212. Id. at 1421. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Institutional investment managers managing at least $100 million must use Form 13F for 
reports to the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2012). 
 215. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 18, at 1421. 
 216. Id. at 1421–23. 
 217. Id. at 1422. 
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the value of the fund under her management.218 Fund portfolio 
managers care very little about the performance of other funds under 
different (business) management within the same institutional 
investor.219 As each fund’s portfolio is likely to be different from other 
funds’ portfolios, fund portfolio managers have conflicting interests 
with respect to competition between portfolio firms.220 A second 
reason for why it would be difficult for an institutional investor to 
orchestrate a cartel is that transmission of the strategy, even assuming 
one was devised, and inducing performance are also complicated and 
dangerous.221 Regardless of who within the institutional investor’s 
organization interacted with portfolio firms’ managers, a formidable 
problem in its own right,222 Hemphill and Kahan argue that 
discussions of specific prices and quantity are likely to draw 
attention.223 Institutional investors regularly focus on corporate 
governance and compensation structure.224 A discussion of specific 
quotas or prices (with more than one product-market firm) would 
“almost certainly raise eyebrows.”225 And institutional investors are 
extremely sensitive to the reputational costs associated with 
scandals.226 The huge impact of even very slight changes in assets 
under management is destructive, even if it is not accompanied by 
criminal charges.227 Institutional investors (specifically mutual fund 
companies): 
[H]ave largely succeeded in staying on everybody’s good 
side. The largest players, in particular, enjoy a squeaky-clean 
image. Any suggestion that an investment advisor as a 
whole . . . had a policy of encouraging firms to pursue an 
anticompetitive strategy would be damaging. . . . And a 
criminal investigation, let alone an indictment, could be 
devastating.228 
 
 218. See id. 
 219. See id. 
 220. Id. at 1422–23. 
 221. See id. at 1424. 
 222. Id. at 1423–26. 
 223. Id. at 1425. 
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Thus, although theoretically possible, the cartel-ringmaster 
scenario is an extremely unlikely one. Moreover, even regardless of 
the implausibility of the scenario, blocking mergers based on the new 
theories of competitive harm seems unjustified from a regulatory cost-
benefit analysis. 
On the cost side, the logic behind applying merger control for fear 
of explicit coordination or information-sharing applies not only to 
cases of significant cross ownership. It applies to any case of a 
shareholder owning stock in two competing firms. The implications of 
a rule designed to prevent such competitive harm would be that all 
instances of cross holding should be regulated, regardless of the share 
of the outstanding stock that is held in each of the firms. Any 
transaction meeting the transaction-size and firm-size thresholds 
would need to be blocked. As explained, in contrast to unilateral 
coordination, regular coordination—tacit or explicit—benefits both 
coordinating firms. If a shareholder is in a position to stabilize a cartel 
(and bear the associated risks), other shareholders’ interests will also 
have been served through this coordination. The incentives to 
eliminate competition are ever-present, and cross ownership does not 
alter them in any way. Thus, coordination through a joint shareholder 
is simply a matter of opportunity and willingness, not of a difference 
in incentives. The question of whether cross ownership is significant 
should not matter. If explicit coordination is truly a concern (and there 
is little reason to think that it is), the “investment-only” exception to 
premerger scrutiny would be effectively abolished. In the specific 
context of institutional investors, a prohibition on cross ownership has 
unimaginable costs. A rule regulating institutional investors’ ability to 
diversify their portfolio will impact the degree of diversification, 
which is an important social tool. Such a rule will increase institutional 
investors’ (and through them, retail investors’) exposure to firm-
specific idiosyncratic risk. Posner et al.’s proposal to limit institutional 
investors’ holdings in oligopolistic industries is a notable example of 
this risk. Posner et al. have suggested limiting institutional investors 
by either allowing them to own stock of only one firm in an 
oligopolistic industry, or by limiting the holdings in each of the firms 
to a total of 1 percent of the value of the industry.229 The first of these 
clearly results in reduced diversification. The second limits the total 
 
 229. Posner et al., supra note 2, at 724. 
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amount any institutional investor may invest in a specific 
(oligopolistic) industry, which imposes a social cost borne by both 
sides of the investment transaction: Institutional investors are forced 
to invest significantly larger portions of their portfolio in less 
appealing opportunities, and oligopolistic-product-market firms are 
denied access to capital which would otherwise have been 
forthcoming. Posner et al. acknowledge that their proposal has a 
negative impact on diversification.230 They argue that the size of the 
effect on diversification would be limited.231 But even if the effect on 
diversification is limited, it nonetheless exists. The diversification and 
discretion of the investors through whom the vast majority of investors 
are exposed to capital markets is curtailed. And this will affect trillions 
of dollars of investments. 
On the benefit side of applying merger control to this setting, very 
little can be gained from such application. As cross ownership itself 
does not affect the incentives of management, no spontaneous anti-
competitive conduct can be expected to ensue. Competition may be 
inhibited only through explicit coordination at the managerial level. 
Such coordination already violates both antitrust laws and corporate 
laws. As explained, each institutional investor has opposing 
preferences with respect to the unilaterally coordinating firm. 
Therefore, institutional investors would need to coordinate amongst 
themselves in order to agree on which firm would unilaterally 
coordinate. This kind of agreement would itself be an antitrust offense. 
Even assuming such an agreement were reached, institutional 
investors would then need to communicate their instructions to 
management, which could not know how to act until instructed. 
Instruction to management to prefer a course of action that benefits the 
cross owning shareholder (or shareholders) at the expense of the firm 
(and all other shareholders) is disallowed by corporate law. Managers 
who complied with the instructions would be intentionally inflicting 
 
 230. Id. at 720. 
 231. Id. at 710 (citing John Y. Campbell et al., Have Individual Stocks Become More Volatile? 
An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. FIN. 1 (2001)). They also suggest additional 
reasons for why the impact on diversification would be limited. These include the narrower 
definition of industry as compared to that proposed by Campbell et al. (who broke major stocks 
into forty-nine industries), the importance of industry diversification, a lack of effect on holdings 
in industries that are not concentrated, and a “safeguard” policy that would allow holdings even 
within the same oligopolistic industry. 
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harm on the corporation,232 thereby breaching their own fiduciary 
duties.233 
It is important to note that, in this context, corporate law would 
prohibit compliance with such instructions independently of antitrust 
laws. In other circumstances, anti-competitive conduct benefits all 
coordinating firms, and as a derivative, all of their shareholders. 
Therefore, absent an antitrust prohibition, corporate law should not 
only allow, but in fact encourage anti-competitive conduct and 
coordination. If not for antitrust law’s prohibition, corporate law 
would applaud even the formation of cartels. It is only antitrust law’s 
condemnation of cartels and other anti-competitive business practices 
that makes them problematic from a corporate-law perspective. 
By contrast, in the current setting the vast majority of the 
unilaterally coordinating firms’ stakeholders lose from the anti-
competitive conduct. As mentioned, unilateral shareholding is simply 
a form of tunneling. With the exception of the cross owning 
shareholder (or shareholders), whose holdings in the unilaterally 
coordinating firm must be relatively small (otherwise unilateral 
coordination will have been unprofitable), all shareholders of the 
unilaterally coordinating firm lose from this unilateral coordination. 
Corporate law prohibits such conduct, which is an egregious breach of 
management’s fiduciary duties, regardless of any antitrust-law 
prohibition. 
Therefore, two independent legislative systems, antitrust law and 
corporate law, already prohibit the only type of conduct that cross 
ownership may incentivize. And each of these pieces of legislation 
prohibits the conduct independently of the other’s prohibition. There 
is little value in additional pieces of legislation that may be applied to 
the situation. 
If there were no downside to applying merger control to the 
situation, its application would be neither beneficial nor harmful. But 
given the social cost of forcing institutional investors to less lucrative 
investments or to undiversified (or much less diversified) portfolios, 
and given the unlikelihood of the cartel ringmaster scenario, the social 
cost is significant. And the benefit of an additional piece of legislation 
that may be cited to address conduct that is already prohibited seems 
 
 232. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.09 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). 
 233. Id. § 8.30. 
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extremely small. It is far better to steer clear from unnecessarily 
regulating institutional investors’ strategy, diversification, and 
discretion. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the analysis presented in this 
Article is, therefore, that antitrust law should not be harnessed to 
prohibit passive cross ownership by non-controlling institutional 
investors. 
 
